Norms, Beliefs, and the Effectiveness of Anti-Bribery Laws

The project investigated how social norms and perceptions of enforcement shaped individuals’ willingness to engage in bribery – revealing risks that undermine global anti-corruption frameworks.

Over the past decades, the international community invested heavily in building a global anti-corruption legal architecture. Instruments such as the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, the UN Convention Against Corruption, and the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime set clear expectations for governments to criminalise and actively pursue corrupt behaviour.

However, while many countries signed on to these commitments, enforcement varied widely. This inconsistency posed a challenge to effectiveness – particularly in contexts where corruption was seen as a social norm. 

The project explored how individuals’ willingness to offer or accept bribes was shaped by their perceptions of what others were likely to do. It also examined how these behaviours varied based on the country-of-origin of both the bribe-payer and the enforcement agent. By quantifying the influence of norms and beliefs on corrupt behaviour, the project helped illuminate why international legal commitments alone are not always enough to deter bribery in practice.

Key Findings

The study used experimental methods across nine countries (N = 2,506) to examine the behavioural underpinnings of international anti-bribery laws. It tested how individuals’ actions were shaped by their expectations of enforcement – specifically, whether they believed a “monitor” would detect, report, and penalise corrupt behaviour.

The presence of a monitor led to a significant drop in bribery. Interestingly, this effect occurred even when participants misunderstood the likelihood of actual penalties – suggesting that the perception of oversight alone can deter corrupt acts.

The findings point to the potential of extraterritorial enforcement tools like the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and the Foreign Extortion Prevention Act (FEPA) in curbing corruption in international business transactions. However, the study also showed that enforcement only works as a deterrent when it is visible. If individuals don’t believe authorities are monitoring behaviour or applying consequences, the law loses its power to prevent wrongdoing.

Impact and Implications

The findings from this project offered practical insights for governments and international institutions working to strengthen anti-corruption policy. By uncovering how norms and perceptions influence behaviour, the research helped identify ways to design laws and enforcement strategies that promote a culture of integrity – not just compliance.

The evidence supported the idea that laws like the FCPA and FEPA can be more effective when paired with visible enforcement and strategic communication. Policymakers and organisations could use these findings to foster behavioural integrity within institutions and across borders – supporting the spread of anti-corruption norms in diverse governance environments.