Informal governance and corruption: Transcending the principal-agent and collective action paradigms
This project explored how informal governance practices sustain corruption in countries that have strong formal anti-corruption frameworks. Through comparative research in East Africa and Central Asia, the study identified how co-optation, control and camouflage serve to redistribute public resources among regime insiders, highlighting the importance of understanding social norms and informal power networks in anti-corruption efforts.
Project Summary
While many countries have adopted formal laws and institutions to combat corruption, high levels of corruption often persist. This project focused on the role of informal governance—unwritten rules, social norms, and hidden networks—in shaping behaviour and undermining formal systems. The research was based on case studies in seven countries: Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Tanzania, Uganda, Georgia and Rwanda.
In five of the countries, informal practices were found to operate as structured systems that maintain elite cohesion, enable rent-seeking, and resist external reform efforts. The study introduced the “3Cs” framework to describe these dynamics:
- Co-optation: Bringing actors into power networks in exchange for loyalty or support
- Control: Enforcing loyalty and discipline within networks
- Camouflage: Masking informal practices under the appearance of lawful conduct
In contrast, Georgia and Rwanda were examined as relative success stories. Their experiences underscore the importance of political leadership independent from entrenched networks and the ability to mobilise reforms through both formal tools and culturally resonant norms.
Key findings
- Informal governance is central to how public resources are allocated in many contexts, often more so than formal rules.
- The persistence of corruption is not due to weak laws but to the strength of informal networks that operate beneath the surface.
- The 3Cs framework helps explain how informal systems are maintained and why formal reforms often fail.
- In Georgia and Rwanda, the emergence of reformist leaders with autonomy from existing networks was key to driving systemic change.
Impact Highlights
- Project findings shaped donor programming, including DFID’s anti-corruption strategy in Tanzania and engagement with the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission in Kenya.
- Influenced policy discussions in Rwanda, including with the Office of the Ombudsman and Rwanda Governance Board.
- Stimulated collaboration with public authorities and donors in Uganda and Malawi to apply findings to practical reform work.
- Findings contributed to the design of new prevention and education programmes focused on understanding informal networks.
Methodology
The project conducted qualitative fieldwork across seven countries, drawing on interviews, document analysis and policy engagement. Country-level research was supported by local partners and used a shared analytical framework focused on mapping informal practices and networks across micro, meso and macro levels.
Publications
Presidential elections Kyrgyzstan 2017
Since its independence in 1991 Kyrgyzstan has experienced mixed developments, oscillating between democratization and semi-authoritarianism. In comparison to other Central Asian regimes, Kyrgyzstan has a much more competitive political environment, having had a succession of four different presidents within 25…
Kyrgyzstan: Lineage Associations and Informal Politics
As Kyrgyzstan constructs a modern national identity, a social institution long considered to be a vestige of the past – lineage identity – continues to exert significant influence over the process. This fact needs to be recognized and addressed. Lineage…
Informal governance and corruption in Kyrgyzstan – Silk road paper
The post-Soviet landscape of Central Asia, characterized by an intricate web of cultural ties, shared histories, and political ambitions, presents a unique case of regional integration that has both fascinated and perplexed international observers. From 1991 to 2005, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,…
Mapping Lineage Leadership in Kyrgyzstan: Lineage Associations and Informal Governance
As Kyrgyzstan constructs a modern national identity, a social institution long considered to be a vestige of the past—lineage identity—continues to exert significant influence over the present-day processes. This fact needs to be recognized and addressed. Lineage affiliations have gained…
Global Encyclopaedia of Informality Vol 1
In Mexico, mordida is a widely used ‘euphemism’ for a petty bribe (Morris 2003). The word literally translates as ‘bite’ from Spanish. While the origins of this euphemistic use of the word are contested, probably the most recurrent explanation given…
Hidden agendas, social norms and why we need to re-think anti-corruption
Despite very substantial investments in anti-corruption, progress is frustratingly limited and in some cases insignificant. The resources devoted to the issue in the last fifteen years have been sizable, stemming from intense activity on the part of multilateral organisations, bilateral…
Where Does Informality Stop and Corruption Begin?
In this article we challenge the prevalent anti-corruption approaches in three ways. First, rather than discussing the failures of anticorruption reforms and the normative anticorruption rhetoric of the leadership in Mexico, Russia and Tanzania, we explore patterns of informal governance…
Informal Governance: Comparative Perspectives on Co-optation, Control and Camouflage in Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda
This article applies a novel conceptual framework to characterise and assess the repertoire of practices used by informal networks to redistribute power and access to resources. These distinct norms and practices are typologised as co-optation, control, and camouflage. Co-optation involves…
Research Team Members
Claudia Baez-Camargo
Alena Ledeneva
Lucy Koechlin
