The behavioural foundations of international anti-bribery laws: Results from an international lab-type experiment

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Abstract

This study employs experimental methods across nine nations (N = 2506) to scrutinize the behavioural foundations of international anti-bribery laws. It assesses how individuals' conduct is influenced by their expectations of enforcement, specifically gauging the probability that a 'Monitor' will detect, report, and penalize their transgressions. The findings reveal a substantial and significant decrease in the incidence of bribery when a Monitor is present. This decline results from the perception that the Monitor will expose corruption, despite participants harboring inaccurate beliefs about the likelihood of Monitors imposing penalties. Our results suggest that the extraterritorial enforcement of anti-corruption laws, such as the Foreign Extortion Prevention Act, holds promise in combating corruption in international business transactions. However, our findings indicate that effective deterrence depends on authorities widely publicizing their enforcement activities. The desired impact of new laws cannot materialize if those targeted lack accurate beliefs about the authorities' inclination to enforce them.

Keywords: Corruption, Experiments, Bribery, Norms, Foreign Extortion Prevention Act

JEL Codes: D73, C91, Z13

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1 Introduction

The international community has invested considerable resources in building international anti-corruption legal architecture, to which many governments have signed up. This includes the wide-ranging UN Convention Against Corruption, to which 190 countries have signed up, and the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, where 46 states have agreed to outlaw the payment of bribes to foreign officials, the so-called 'supply side' of bribery in international business transactions. However, historically, countries have varied considerably in the implementation of their commitments and resources they devote to enforcement. The United States has been the primary enforcer of anti-bribery laws and recently passed the Foreign Extortion Prevention Act (2023), criminalising the 'demand side' of foreign bribery by making it a crime for any foreign official to demand, or accept, a bribe from an American or American company in connection with obtaining or retaining business. A growing body of research suggests that individuals engage in corruption where they see it as a widespread social norm and/or because they assume that others in their environment will behave corruptly (Bicchieri and Duffy, 1997; Persson et al., 2012). Therefore any variation in enforcement might seriously undermine the laws' overall effectiveness as a global anti-corruption tool. Perceptions about the likely differences in behaviour of foreign direct investors and law enforcement agents from different countries are highly relevant to understanding international (non)compliance with anti-corruption laws.

In this paper we present the findings from a bribery experiment involving participants across nine countries to investigate how variations in the perception of norms and beliefs about the behaviour of international law enforcers/whistle-blowers affect the implementation of international anti-corruption laws. Further, we develop interventions that provide a foundation for better policy implementation to improve compliance and deter corruption more effectively. Our sample of countries consists of developed and developing countries. The developed countries - United Kingdom, United States, and Germany are the source of substantial amounts of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The developing countries - Bangladesh,

China, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and Uganda are major recipients of international investments. China stands out as being, in addition, a very important investor country, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa.

Our experiment is based on a modified version of the Bribery game (Barr and Serra, 2009, 2010) utilising the strategy method introduced by Selten (1967). In the bribery game one player is an Investor and another a Public Servant. They play a bargaining game in which the acceptance by the Public Servant of a bribe offered by the Investor reduces the monetary payoff of a third, passive player, referred to as the Other Member of the Society (OMS). The OMS does not make any decisions in the game and exists only to make tangible the negative externalities of bribery, i.e., the harm to the public interest. In a treatment we introduce a fourth player - the Monitor, who can report, at a cost, any bribing attempts, thereby bringing in the threat of 'enforcement'. In our experimental design, the report has a 50% chance of causing a bribe offering Investor to be fined. The uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of reporting in addition to its costly nature reduce its appeal to the Monitor in ways that correspond to real-life scenarios. We randomly allocated participants across the four experimental roles and imposed some restrictions regarding the roles that participants from each country could play, in line with the focus of our research questions, and cognisant of the need to avoid burdening participants with too many decisions. For example, by utilising the strategy method we can have a participant in the UK in the role of the Investor, interacting with a Public Servant and OMS in Kenya and a Monitor in the United States, and then a Public Servant and OMS in China and a Monitor in Germany. This design allows us to explore how elicited beliefs about the expected behaviour of others are affected by national stereotypes. In addition, we measure the extent to which our participants consider bribe offering and taking (un)acceptable following Krupka and Weber (2013), as well as several other attitudinal, behavioural, and demographic characteristics.

We find consistency across our sample with regard to some norms relating to bribery. For example, taking a bribe is less acceptable than offering one; and reporting a bribe is

considered relatively acceptable in all the countries in our sample. However, we also find variations across the nine countries. The relative acceptability of offering a bribe is greater in some countries than others. Of all the countries in the sample, participants in the United States were least accepting of taking a bribe. Across the nine countries in our sample, norms about taking a bribe correlate with scores on the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2020.

In the Bribery game, the sub-game perfect equilibrium for self-interested, rational participants is for the Investor to offer a bribe, the Public Servant to accept it, and the Monitor, when present, not to report it. Combined with the online, anonymous, and asynchronous administration of the experiment, we have created an environment in which bribery is logically appealing and the presence of a Monitor has no impact on this logical appeal. However, we find that participants significantly reduce their bribe offering when a Monitor exists. We also find that the change in behaviour can be explained by the beliefs of the Investors about the likelihood of the Monitor deciding to report them. However, the beliefs of our Investors are not accurate as they fear that Monitors in Germany are most likely to report, when it is in fact those Monitors in the United States who report more based on our results.

From a policy perspective, these findings demonstrate the critical role of beliefs in the enforcement of international anti-corruption laws, but also the deterrence effect of advertising any enforcement activities undertaken by authorities. In a different criminal context this is consistent with the findings in Boning et al. (2023) that IRS audits had a lasting deterrence effect on the audited, probably by making them revise their beliefs about the probability of audits, and with those in Philippe (ming) where he shows that criminals only update their beliefs about the severity of criminal punishment when it directly affects them or close criminal associates.

The paper most closely related to ours is by Dorrough et al. (2023) who show in an incentivised cross-country experiment, such as ours, that people hold inaccurate stereotypes based on nationalities about the propensity to accept bribes and that they act upon their miscon-

ceptions. Our experiment differs in three significant ways: first, in line with recent policy developments, we introduce international 'monitoring' as a treatment and, thereby explore its efficacy. Second, Dorrough et al. (2023) engage participants mostly in middle/high-income countries, whereas a large part of our sample consists of participants in low-income countries. Third, we explicitly measure the acceptability of corruption related activities.

A growing literature has approached corruption as an informal social norm, with bribes frequently paid to secure or 'sweeten' contracts, evade regulations, or 'grease the wheels' by speeding up bureaucratically inefficient processes (Dutt and Traca, 2010; Dreher and Gassebner, 2011; Lui, 1985). Other research finds suggestive evidence that individuals assume that most others in their environment will behave corruptly, making it irrational for them to eschew or punish corruption (Bicchieri and Duffy, 1997; Persson et al., 2012; Köbis et al., 2015). This indicates that 'descriptive' social norms, in the form of information about others' corrupt behaviour affects decision making, creating a 'conformism' that can lead to contagion of corrupt behaviour (Schram et al., 2022). However, the work of (Barr and Serra, 2010) indicates that the propensity to bribe can also be reduced by exposure to societies in which prescriptive norms around corruption are less prevalent.

Research has also shown that behaviour is affected by the possibility of social observability and judgement (Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006; Gerber et al., 2008; Ariely et al., 2009; Carpenter and Myers, 2010; Linardi and McConnell, 2011; Xiao and Houser, 2011). The 'monitoring' of transactions by 'watchdogs' is designed to directly detect illicit behaviour, thus increasing the perception of increased risk of being caught (Klitgaard, 1988). For example, an effective audit process in public procurement improves transparency and competition, whilst reducing corruption (Olken, 2007; Knack et al., 2019; Zamboni and Litschig, 2018; Avis et al., 2018), leading to reduced prices for homogeneous goods (Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2003). In an experimental setting Azfar and Nelson (2007) show that corporate executives are less likely to be re-elected if corrupt behaviour has been exposed.

Our paper also contributes to the literature on third-party punishment in the enforcement of social norms (Balafoutas et al., 2016; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Falk et al., 2005; Charness and Gneezy, 2008; Marlowe et al., 2007), in the provision of public goods (Henrich et al., 2006; Nikiforakis and Mitchell, 2013; Zhou et al., 2023) and specifically of monitoring in bribery experiments (Guerra and Zhuravleva, 2021, 2022). Finally, we believe that our paper is the first to investigate the behavioural foundations of recent developments in international anti-corruption policy. The OECD Convention as enshrined in US law by extraterritorial policy such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) (1977), and the more recent Foreign Extortion Prevention Act (FEPA) (2023), are formal sanctions with the explicit intent to threaten punishment (Senci et al., 2019), on both the supply and demand side of bribery. A consequence of their existence is that they have a norm expressive function (Cooter, 1998; Funk, 2007; Galbiati and Vertova, 2008; Galbiati et al., 2013; Masclet et al., 2003; Sunstein, 1996; Tyran and Feld, 2006; Kube and Traxler, 2011). That is, they inform people of the desired prescriptive norm in their decision making, whilst empowering third parties external to the corrupt behaviour. When viewed through the lens of optimal deterrence theory (Becker, 1968), the threat of punishment is most effective when there is an increase in the risk of being caught. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to experimentally investigate the impact of an international Monitor, and the dynamics of international enforcement considering the extraterritorial nature of the OECD Convention and, to a degree, the recent US legislation in the form of the FEPA (2023).

The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 describes the recruitment protocol and the games used in our experiment, section 3 presents the empirical findings, and section 4 concludes.

2 Experimental design

We administered five experimental tasks using the strategy method (Selten, 1967), followed by a questionnaire. First, the participants made decisions in a series of bribery games (Barr and Serra, 2009, 2010) and stated their beliefs about others' likely decision in the games. Next, we elicited the participants' opinions regarding bribery using the procedure set out in Krupka and Weber (2013). After that, they made decisions in the mind game (Kajackaite and Gneezy, 2017; Jiang, 2013), and the dictator game (Kahneman et al., 1986). Finally, we elicited norms regarding bribery in a business scenario and collected information regarding demographics[1]. Participants were paid for one randomly chosen decision in a randomly chosen task. If necessary, participants were matched ex post with randomly chosen participants in the appropriate role and country to determine their payments. In every decision-making screen, participants were given the opportunity to reread the instructions of the relevant task. Before proceeding to any of the tasks, the information sheet was displayed on screen, with participants providing consent to taking part in the study.

2.1 The bribery game - Task 1

Our primary experimental task builds on the game by Barr and Serra (2009, 2010). In the BASELINE treatment (Figure 1) there are three players: the Investor (I), the Public Servant (PS), and the Other Member of Society (OMS). Since we use the strategy method, in the game tree, nodes in the same information set are marked with a dashed line. The Investor offers a bribe $b \in \{0, 1, 2, ..., 20\}$ to the Public Servant.[2] If the Investor does not offer a bribe (b=0), all players get their initial endowment of 35 points for the Investor and Public Servant and 25 points for the OMS. The Public Servant specifies a minimum acceptable bribe: $mab \in \{1, 2, ..., 21\}$, where 21 means that the Public Servant is not willing to accept any bribe. In the experimental task the option to decline any possible offer ($mab = 21$) was

[1] A full set of instructions can be found in the Appendix.

[2] Following pilot sessions we decided to use the term "side payment" in the instructions. Declining to offer a side payment was labelled as "I don't want to offer a side payment".

labelled as "I would accept no side payment". If $b < mab$, then the bribe offer is rejected, and all players get their initial endowment except for the Investor, who loses one point (earns 34 points), reflecting the sunk cost of the bribery attempt. If $b \geq mab$, the bribe is accepted. Consequently, the OMS earns 10 points (a deduction of 15 points), reflecting the negative externality. The Investor earns $50 - b$ and the Public Servant earns $30 + b$. This reflects that the Public Servant has some cost for arranging the deal favouring the briber (getting 30 points instead of 35) and that the bribe confers a private benefit to the Investor (getting up to 50 points instead of 35). Assuming the Investor and the Public Servant are purely self-interested, the Public Servant will set $mab \geq 5$ points, so as to ensure that in the event of a bribe being accepted they are not worse off than not taking the bribe. The Investor knows this and will offer a bribe of 5. This is the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. Beyond that there are several mutually beneficial agreements to be made between the Investor and the Public Servant where $mab \geq 5$ and $b \in \{5, 6, ..., 20\}$, which $b = 10$ constituting an equal split offer of the surplus of 20 between Investor and public official.



Figure 1: Baseline treatment extensive form game. I is the Investor, PS is the Public Servant. The payoffs are displayed in this order: Investor, Public Servant, Other Member of the Society (OMS). The OMS does not take any decisions, hence they do not appear on the decision tree otherwise. The offer of the Investor is $b \in \{0, ..., 20\}$. The PS sets their minimum acceptable offer: $mab \in \{1, ..., 21\}$. The dashed lines indicate nodes that belong to the same information set.

In the MONITOR treatment (Figure 2) we introduce an additional player: the Monitor (M). If the Investor makes no attempt to bribe the Public Servant ($b = 0$), the Monitor, the Investor and the Public Servant earn 35 points. The OMS earns 25 points. If the Investor

makes an offer ($b \geq 1$), the Monitor earns 30 points if they file a report and 35 points if they do not. The loss of 5 points to file a report makes the decision of the Monitor costly. If the Public Servant rejects the offer of the Investor, they earn 35 points and the OMS earns 25 points. If the Public Servant accepts the offer of the Investor, they earn $30 + b$ points and the OMS earns 10 points. If the Public Servant rejects the offer of the Investor, the Investor earns an interim payoff of 34 points. If the offer is accepted, they earn an interim payoff of $50 - b$ points. If the Monitor filed no report or if the report was unsuccessful, the interim payoff becomes final. However, if the Monitor's report is successful, the Investor's final payoff is the interim payoff minus 20 points. A report by the Monitor has an equal (50%) chance of being successful. Since in our treatment reporting is costly, a self-interested Monitor would not file a report. Therefore the game-theoretical equilibrium is unaffected in this treatment. If a report is filed, we interpret this is as suggestion of a moral imperative on behalf of the Monitor to denounce any misgivings.

Participants were told how the payoffs for every role are determined. They also had to answer comprehension questions before they were allowed to proceed. The roles in the experiment were assigned randomly and held fixed for the duration of the bribery game. We varied the country where the participants in the other roles were based. The OMS and the Public Servant were always in the same country, as we are interested in the negative externality imposed on the compatriots of the Public Servant. The Investors and the Monitors were in the UK, USA, Germany, China, or the country in which the participant was located if it was not one of the aforementioned countries. The Public Servant and the OMS were in the UK, USA, Germany, China, Ghana, Uganda, Kenya, Nigeria, and Bangladesh. To better illustrate the procedure consider the following example in Figure 3: An Investor in the MONITOR treatment in the United Kingdom was initially matched with a Public Servant/OMS in China and a Monitor in Germany. In the following round the Monitor is in the United States. The location of the other participants does not change. Then, the Investor is matched with a Public Servant and OMS in China, and a Monitor in the United States.



Figure 2: Monitor treatment extensive form game. I is the Investor, PS is the Public Servant. The payoffs are displayed in this order: Investor, Public Servant, Other Member of the Society (OMS), Monitor (M). The OMS does not take any decisions, hence they do not appear on the decision tree otherwise. The offer of the Investor is $b \in \{0, ..., 20\}$. The PS sets their minimum acceptable offer: $mab \in \{1, ..., 21\}$. The M decides whether to report or not should a bribe be offered. N in the graph represents the random draw by Nature determining whether the report is successful or not with equal probability. The dashed lines indicate nodes that belong to the same information set.

Participants were randomly assigned to roles and we randomized the order in which they saw the various combinations of countries. Depending on their roles, participants submitted between 4 and 30 decisions.[3] Overall we have a within-subject design with respect to the decisions across countries and a between-subject design with respect to the two treatments, with Monitor or without.

Figure 3: Example of Investor's screen in the Monitor treatment of the Bribery game.

In this paper, we focus on behaviour in the cross-country bribery games only (more on this below). In all of these games the harmed passive player is always in a country other than the Monitor's own, so bias against outgroups may erode any moral imperative. Given all of this, the only reason why an Investor would expect a Monitor to report is that the Investor believes that the Monitor will act on such a moral imperative. Thus, in our experiment the efficacy of monitoring as a deterrent against international bribery depends on the bribers' beliefs about the moral integrity of the Monitors.

In addition to the strategic decisions, we elicited without incentives the beliefs of the participants. Investors were asked what they thought was the minimum amount the Public Servant would accept, Public Servants were asked what offer they thought the Investor would

[3]Because of a glitch in the software we are unable to determine the country with which some participants were matched. This glitch affected approximately 1% of the decisions submitted by participants. We discard those observations and we control for the effect of the glitch controlling for the round in which a decision was taken.

make, and the OMS was asked to report their expectation about the behavior of the Investor. In the MONITOR treatment they were also asked whether they expected the Monitor to report, whilst the Monitor was asked what they expected the Investor's offer to be.

2.2 Social norm elicitation - Task 2

Immediately after the bribery game, we elicited the norms regarding bribery in the home country of the participants using the method proposed by Krupka and Weber (2013). The wording we used for the task is presented in table 1. Note that we asked them both to evaluate the appropriateness to make, and not to make, a certain decision. They had to evaluate how socially appropriate it would be for an Investor (Public Servant) in their country to offer, or not offer (accept or not accept), a side payment. In the MONITOR treatment we asked them in addition to evaluate the social appropriateness of a Monitor in their country reporting, or not reporting, the Investor. Participants were instructed that if this task was chosen for payment, they would receive 50 points if they had chosen the most common answer in a randomly drawn group of 9 other participants in their country. Otherwise, they were told they would earn 10 points.

2.3 The mind game - Task 3

Next, we administered the mind game (Jiang, 2013; Kajackaite and Gneezy, 2017) to obtain a measure of our participants' honesty. This task consists of ten rounds, in each round participants were asked to think of an integer from 1 to 10. They were asked not to write down this number or input it into the experimental software. The participants were then asked to report whether the number on display matches their number. If they report that it does, this yields a payoff of 6 points. Otherwise, the payoff is 0 points. This is repeated ten times, and payoffs are summed up over the ten rounds. The probability that a participant thinks of the 'correct' number in 10 rounds is 10%. The more matching guesses participants claim to have made, the higher the probability that they are cheating to earn a higher payoff.

Someone in UK is in the **INVESTOR** role and offers a side payment.
This is...
very socially appropriate ○ ○ ○ ○ very socially inappropriate

Someone in UK is in the **INVESTOR** role and does NOT offer a side payment.
This is...
very socially appropriate ○ ○ ○ ○ very socially inappropriate

Someone in UK is in the **PUBLIC SERVANT** role and accepts a side payment.
This is...
very socially appropriate ○ ○ ○ ○ very socially inappropriate

Someone in UK is in the **PUBLIC SERVANT** role and does NOT accept a side payment.
This is...
very socially appropriate ○ ○ ○ ○ very socially inappropriate

Someone in UK is in the role of **MONITOR** and decides NOT to report the **Investor**.
This is...
very socially appropriate ○ ○ ○ ○ very socially inappropriate

Someone in UK is in the role of **MONITOR** and decides to report the **Investor**.
This is...
very socially appropriate ○ ○ ○ ○ very socially inappropriate

Table 1: Norms elicitation task following the Bribery game. The last two statements were displayed only in the Monitor treatment. All statements were rated on a 4-point Likert scale from 1 (very socially appropriate) to -1 (very socially inappropriate).

2.4 The dictator game - Task 4

The fourth task was the dictator game (Kahneman et al., 1986). In this task there are two roles: the Sender and the Receiver. The Sender is endowed with 60 points and decides how many to send to the Receiver, who has 0 points. The Receiver makes no decision. The dictator game measures social preferences regarding altruism and fairness considerations towards the Receiver. Participants submitted decisions without knowing which role they would have. In the event they would end up being the Receiver, we elicited their non incentivized belief regarding the number of points the Sender would give them. Participants gave us their responses for all the possible countries in which the other participant was based with the order of countries randomized.

2.5 Framed social norm elicitation - Task 5

The final task was a repetition of task 2, but this time in a framed scenario. We asked participants to evaluate the social appropriateness of a contractor in their country offering (not offering) a side payment to a Public Servant to increase their chances of being short-listed for a lucrative contract. Similarly, for the Public Servant we asked them to evaluate the social appropriateness of accepting (not accepting) the abovementioned side payment, and for the Monitor to report (not report) the attempt to offer this side payment. Participants were incentivized as in task 2. By being directly presented as a real-world scenario, this task allows us to gauge the external validity of the decisions submitted in the bribery game and it provides a second measure for the social norms we elicited in the second task.

2.6 Questionnaire

Finally, we administered a questionnaire to collect information regarding: demographics (age, gender, marital status, etc); the field of studies of our participants; political orientation; the Big-5 personality measures; labour market experience (e.g. if they had previously worked in

the public sector or in which sector they wished to work in the future); their use of social media; relative income and material deprivation; risk attitudes (Dohmen et al., 2011); trust in others; their opinion on their government's response to the pandemic at the time; their beliefs about corruption and favoritism in business in their country.

2.7 Recruitment of participants

The experiment was programmed in classEX (Giamattei and Lambsdorff, 2019). In countries where our partners operated an established experimental laboratory, we recruited participants sending invitations to the online experiment through the database our partners maintained to invite participants to the laboratory.

In countries where no such laboratory existed, we employed a three-step procedure with the aim of simulating the recruitment process of participants in established labs. First, our partners engaged in recruitment drives that made potential participants aware of the possibility to sign up to receive invitations to participate in research studies. Second, our partners directed potential participants to a webpage. On the webpage we provided information that is commonly provided on the sign-up pages of established laboratories: what do economic experiments consist of, what are the rules of the laboratory, who are the researchers affiliated with the laboratory. We also asked potential participants to accept those rules if they wanted to be invited to our experiment. Finally, we asked them to provide their details (email address, name, surname, details necessary for payment, such as their mobile phone number). Invitations to the actual experiment were sent to those who had signed up to this database.

Invitations to the experiment, in all countries, contained the link to the experiment in classEX. The links were unique, and participants were told so, as well as that only the first attempt would be used for payment. They were also told that the link would remain active for a limited period of time. We implemented checks to filter out attempts to participate more than once and, in those rare cases, we withheld payment. In the experiment we did not

mention monetary earnings associated with the choices of the participants. Instead, we talked of points and the number of points was constant across countries. Participants were informed about the exchange rate of points to monetary units in their country, but not about that in other countries. In countries with established labs, we used the laboratories' guidelines to calibrate the exchange rate. In countries without established laboratories, we determined an amount that would be approximately equivalent for the local labor market with the help of our local partners. We ensured that the participation fee would be enough to cover the cost of mobile data. This was a concern particularly for some countries with low landline internet penetration and we wanted to avoid this source of selection bias. Table 2 shows the average amount earned for each country. For the sake of comparison we also converted the amount in the local currency to purchasing power parity adjusted United States Dollars ($) using the conversion factor from the World Bank. In total in our experiment we had 2506 participants and the sessions were administered between September 2020 and June 2022.

Country	Earnings in local currency	Earnings in PPP $
Bangladesh	444.44	14.02
China	68.26	16.33
Germany	13.90	19.04
Ghana	34.04	15.83
Kenya	472.00	10.81
Nigeria	2259.00	15.66
Uganda	21 883.00	16.44
UK	9.9	14.78
USA	14.81	14.81

Table 2: Average payments in the local currency and conversion into US Dollars using PPP conversion from the World Bank.

A.	US	UK	DE	CN	BD	GH	UG	NG	KE	All
Number of participants	313	265	277	360	242	263	271	293	222	2506
Participant characteristics: Demographics										
Female	71%	60%	69%	72%	28%	28%	42%	58%	54%	55%
Male	27%	40%	30%	27%	72%	72%	58%	42%	46%	45%
Other gender	2%	0.3%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Age (years)	23.81	21.18	22.75	19.92	23.45	23.64	25.36	23.90	23.21	22.93
Household income										
decile 1	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	1%	5%	1%	9%	2%
decile 2	3%	2%	2%	0%	2%	7%	4%	3%	8%	3%
decile 3	7%	9%	8%	1%	9%	17%	17%	9%	20%	10%
decile 4	8%	11%	9%	6%	11%	19%	28%	14%	20%	13%
decile 5	12%	9%	9%	11%	17%	19%	20%	24%	25%	16%
decile 6	18%	18%	20%	27%	21%	19%	14%	20%	12%	19%
decile 7	26%	30%	25%	33%	25%	12%	9%	16%	6%	21%
decile 8	18%	17%	19%	19%	12%	5%	3%	8%	1%	12%
decile 9	6%	3%	5%	2%	1%	0%	1%	2%	0%	2%
decile 10	2%	0%	0%	1%	2%	1%	0%	3%	0%	1%

B.

Participant characteristics: Major subject at college or university

	US	UK	DE	CN	BD	GH	UG	NG	KE	All
Sciences, Math	38%	35%	4%	20%	7%	19%	21%	19%	40%	23%
Engineering										
Business,	12%	18%	24%	57%	86%	39%	7%	26%	18%	32%
Economics										
Health,	18%	15%	16%	1%	2%	22%	50%	21%	18%	18%
Education										
Other Social Science,	17%	24%	32%	14%	2%	8%	9%	6%	7%	13%
Humanities, Languages										
Other subjects	14%	8%	24%	8%	4%	13%	13%	28%	17%	14%

Table 3: Participants' characteristics. Panel A shows the distribution of participants by country, gender, age, and self-assessed relative household income. Panel B shows the distribution of participants by country and major studied at university.

C.	US	UK	DE	CN	BD	GH	UG	NG	KE	All
Participant characteristics: Work experience, current or previous										
in public sector	42%	34%	45%	15%	10%	35%	25%	25%	38%	30%
in private sector	60%	49%	72%	28%	57%	74%	66%	63%	58%	58%
in non-profit sector	35%	31%	38%	30%	41%	39%	43%	43%	45%	38%
D.										
Experimental assignment to role (random)										
Investor	25%	24%	26%	24%	21%	26%	23%	24%	25%	24%
Public Servant	32%	31%	31%	32%	36%	31%	35%	34%	34%	33%
Other Member of Society	31%	33%	31%	32%	32%	30%	32%	31%	30%	31%
Monitor	12%	12%	12%	12%	10%	13%	10%	10%	11%	11%
Experimental assignment to treatment (random)										
Baseline	51%	51%	51%	53%	59%	55%	51%	58%	55%	54%
Monitor	49%	49%	49%	47%	41%	45%	49%	42%	45%	46%

Table 4: Panel C shows the distribution of participants by country and work experience. Panel D shows the allocation of participants into experimental treatments and roles. For every participant characteristic in panels A-C, null of no variation across countries is rejected ($p < 0.0001$). For experimental role and treatment assignments, nulls of no variation across countries are not rejected ($p = 0.99$, $p = 0.36$ respectively). For every participant characteristic, null of no variation across role assignments is not rejected ($0.12 < p < 0.95$). For every participant characteristic, null of no variation across treatments is not rejected ($0.32 < p < 0.89$). For participant characteristics for the samples used in the statistical analyses, see appendix A.

In tables 3 and 4 we present descriptive statistics regarding the characteristics of our participants and the allocation of participants into roles and treatments. For every participant characteristic in panels A-C, the null of no variation across countries is rejected ($p < 0.0001$). For the experimental role and treatment assignments, the nulls of no variation across countries are not rejected ($p = 0.99$, $p = 0.36$ respectively). For every participant characteristic, the null of no variation across role assignments is not rejected ($0.12 < p < 0.95$). For every participant characteristic, the null of no variation across treatments is not rejected ($0.32 < p < 0.89$).

3 Results

3.1 The social acceptability of bribing across countries

We begin the presentation of our results investigating whether there are differences with respect to the acceptability of bribes in the countries in our sample. First, we construct the relative acceptability of offering a bribe by taking the difference between the acceptability of offering and the acceptability of not offering a bribe. We use the responses in the social norms elicitation task following the Bribery game. We assign the numeric value of 1 to responses indicating that a behaviour is very acceptable and -1 to those indicating that it is very unacceptable. Somewhat acceptable or unacceptable are assigned values 0.33 and -0.33 respectively. We then calculate our relative acceptability measure as the acceptability of offering a bribe in the bribery game – the acceptability of not offering a bribe in the bribery game. This index can take values from -2 to +2. We do the same for taking and reporting a bribe to construct the respective relative acceptability values. The average relative acceptability values by country are presented in table 5. For all three variables, the null of no variation across countries is rejected ($p < 0.0001$). This suggests that there are differences in the norms regarding all aspects of bribing across the countries of our sample. As depicted in figure 4, greater relative acceptability of taking bribes is positively correlated with the relative acceptability of offering bribes, suggesting that the responses of our participants were internally consistent.

To sense check our data, we plot in figure 5 the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (TICPI) 2020 score for each country and the average relative acceptability of taking a bribe in our sample. We observe that countries with greater scores in the TICPI 2020 index, also have lower relative acceptability of taking a bribe in our sample. We cautiously interpret this as an indication of external validity of our findings.

Table 6 presents regressions on the relative acceptability of bribing related behaviours at the individual level. In columns (1) and (2) the dependent variable is the relative ac-

ceptability of offering a bribe. In columns (3) and (4) the dependent variable is the relative acceptability of bribe taking. In columns (5) and (6) the dependent variable is the relative acceptability of reporting, similarly defined. In all columns, an observation is a participant. We present marginal effects from linear regression models. In columns (1), (3) and (5) USA, UK, and Germany are pooled and are the basis for comparison and Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda are pooled and referred to collectively as Africa. In columns (2), (4) and (6) there is no such pooling and the basis for comparison in the USA. In all specifications we include controls for the participants' characteristics which we detailed in tables 3 and 4. We also include controls about the administration of the experiments in each country. We find that offering a bribe is relatively acceptable in China, Bangladesh, Ghana, Nigeria and Kenya (the latter with diminished statistical significance). We find no evidence for differences in the relative acceptability of offering a bribe between the US, UK, Germany, and Uganda, albeit we find more variability in terms of accepting a bribe in table 6. All countries differ statistically from the USA as seen in columns (3) and (4). Finally, with respect to reporting a bribing attempt, all countries except for China, Germany, and Uganda in column (6) consider reporting less appropriate than participants in the USA. China, Germany, and Uganda participants do not differ from those in the USA in this regard. It is noteworthy that having being assigned the role of the Monitor in the Bribery game decreases the relative acceptability of offering or accepting a bribe, and increases the relative acceptability of reporting a bribing attempt. Since the allocation to roles in the Bribery game was random, we can attribute a causal interpretation to this finding.

3.2 The impact of Monitoring

In table 7 we present results from linear probability models regarding the role of monitoring in the Bribery game. In all columns of Table 7 the dependent variable equals 1 if an Investor offered a bribe and zero otherwise. An observation is a participant in a round. In columns (1), (3) and (5) USA, UK, and Germany are pooled and, when the focus in the Investor's own

	US	UK	DE	CN	BD	GH	UG	NG	KE	All
Relative acceptability of:										
Offering	-0.31	-0.25	-0.27	0.42	0.10	0.13	-0.07	0.41	0.11	0.04
Obs.	313	265	277	359	241	262	271	293	222	2503
Taking	-1.02	-0.81	-0.76	-0.33	-0.12	-0.25	-0.29	0.14	-0.19	-0.41
Obs.	313	265	277	359	241	262	271	293	222	2503
Reporting	1.03	0.97	0.96	0.49	0.73	0.34	0.71	0.22	0.64	0.68
Obs.	154	129	136	169	98	119	132	122	101	1160

Table 5: Relative acceptability of bribes by country. An observation is a participant. Relative acceptability of offering/taking/reporting = acceptability of offering/taking/ reporting - acceptability of NOT offering/taking/reporting; very acceptable set equal to 1; somewhat acceptable to 0.33; somewhat unacceptable to -0.33; very unacceptable to -1. For all three variables, the null of no variation across countries is rejected ($p < 0.0001$).

country, are the basis for comparison, and Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda are pooled and serve as the basis for comparison when the focus is the Public Servant's country. In columns (2), (4) and (6) there is no such pooling and the basis for comparison in the USA when the focus is the Investor's own country or the Monitor's country and Ghana when the focus in the Public Servant's country. We include protocol controls and participant characteristics in all estimations.

In column (1) we observe that the in the Monitor treatment the probability of offering a bribe is reduced by approximately 10 percentage points. This is an economically and statistically significant reduction. We also note that that the presence of a Public Servant in China reduced the probability of offering a bribe by about 8 percentage points.

In column (2) we examine the effect of the country of the Monitor on the probability of offering a bribe. We notice that Monitors from the USA or the UK reduce the probability of bribing by about 8.5 percentage points, whereas a Chinese Monitor reduces the probability of offering a bribe by 11.6 percentage points, and a Monitor in Germany reduces bribe-offering by 13.5 percentage points. All coefficients are statistically significant. The coefficient of the



Figure 4: Relative acceptability of offering, reporting, and taking a bribe by country. The vertical red lines denotes where the point of relative indifference (0) is.

German Monitor is statistically different from that of the UK Monitor ($p - value = 0.0285$) and weakly different from that of the US Monitor ($p-value = 0.0524$). No other comparisons of the coefficients of the effect of Monitors are statistically significant.

3.3 The role of beliefs

We now turn our attention to investigating the role of beliefs. We elicited non-incentivized beliefs in the Bribery game regarding the possibility of the Monitor reporting a bribe and of the Public Servant accepting it.

In column (3) of table 7 we have included as a control a binary variable "I believe M will report" which takes the value 1 if the Investor believes that the Monitor will report a bribe



Figure 5: Correlation between the Transparency International 2020 score for each country and the relative acceptability of taking a bribe in our sample.

and zero otherwise. We notice that the coefficient of the Monitor in column (3) becomes insignificant and is almost zero. On the other hand, the coefficient of the belief that the Monitor is going to report is strongly significant and suggests a reduction of 20 percentage points in the probability of offering a bribe. This finding remains the same in column (4) where we disaggregate the presence of the Monitor by country.

In columns (5) and (6) of table 7 we include the Investor's belief about the Public Servant accepting and the Investor's relative acceptability of bribe offering as extra controls. Both are highly significant in both regressions and their inclusion reduces the absolute size but not the significance of the effect of the Investor's belief about the Monitor. Taken together these results strongly suggest that the effect of monitoring works via the belief that the Monitor is going to report, regardless of their country of origin.

It is worth noting that in all regressions the coefficient of a Public Servant in China remains negative and statistically significant, suggesting that participants in our experiment were less likely to offer a bribe to a Public Servant in China even controlling for their beliefs about the Monitor, the relative acceptability of bribing in the Investor's country, and the Investor's belief about whether the Public Servant would accept a bribe.

3.4 Accuracy of beliefs

Having seen in the previous sub-section the importance of the beliefs about the effectiveness of monitoring, we turn now to examining the accuracy of respective beliefs of the participants in our experiment. In both columns of table 8 the dependent variable equals 1 if an Investor indicated that they believed that the Monitor would report and zero otherwise. An observation is a participant in a round in the Monitor treatment. We present estimates of marginal effects from linear probability models. In both columns, USA serves as the basis for comparison when the focus is the Investor's own country or the Monitor's country. We include a full set of Public Servant country indicator variables, which are neither individually nor jointly significant in either estimation. We also include protocol controls and participant characteristics. In column (2) we include an indicator about whether the Monitor is in the same country as the Investor, since one may hold more accurate beliefs about other participants in their own country. In both regressions we find that the beliefs about the behaviour of the Investors and that of the Monitors from any country are not statistically different from that of Investors/Monitors in the USA, except for Monitors in Germany. Our participants believe that Monitors in Germany are about 9 percentage points more likely to report, this coefficient is both statistically and economically significant.

In all columns of Table 9 the dependent variable equals 1 if a Monitor paid to report if an Investor offered a bribe. An observation is a participant in the Monitor role in a round. In columns (1) and (3) USA, UK, and Germany are pooled and, when the focus is the Monitor's own country, are the basis for comparison, and the only Investor-related explanatory variable

is an indicator of the Investor being in the same country as the Monitor. In columns (2) and (4) USA, UK, and Germany are not pooled, a full set of Investor's country identifiers are included and the USA is the basis for comparison when the focus is either the Monitor's own or the Investor's country. In columns (2) and (4) a full set of Public Servant's country identifiers are also included with Ghana as the basis for comparison. We present estimates of marginal effects from linear probability models, including protocol controls and participant characteristics in all the estimations. In our experiment Monitors are less likely to report if the Investor is in their own country, the reduction is between 5 and 7 percentage points, depending on the specification, and statistically significant in all cases. Monitors are also 11 percentage points less likely to report when the Public Servant is in Kenya. Monitors who are in the United Kingdom are about 15 percentage points less likely to report and that coefficient is weakly statistically significant. More importantly, we find no differences in the propensity to report for Monitors based in the US, China, or Germany. This shows that the beliefs of the Investors in table 8 regarding the behaviour of Monitors are inaccurate.

4 Conclusion

In this paper we study the role of extraterritorial enforcement of anti-corruption laws in international investments considering the new US Foreign Extortion Prevention Act (2023). To that end we devised and administered an online experiment in nine countries. Our sample consists of low-, middle- and high-income countries. Some of our countries are primarily recipients of international investment and others are primarily countries where investors are based.

First, we document substantial variation in the relative acceptability of norms, in particular with respect to giving and taking bribes, in the countries of our sample. Then, we proceed to examine participants' individual behaviour in our main experimental task: the Bribery game (Barr and Serra, 2009, 2010). We find that the presence of a Monitor sub-

stantially and significantly decreases the incidence of bribing. This reduction is driven by the belief that the Monitor is going to report a corrupt deal, but our participants also hold inaccurate beliefs about the propensity of Monitors to punish. In particular, they believe that Monitors in Germany are the most likely to punish, whereas it is those in the USA who actually punish more in our experiment.

In the first instance, our findings suggest that the extraterritorial enforcement of anti-corruption laws such as the FEPA has the potential to help in combating corruption in international business deals. However, it is important that the authorities make their enforcement activities as widely known as possible. The deterrence effect of the law cannot be achieved if those whose behaviour it aims to alter do not hold accurate beliefs about the tendency of the relevant authorities to monitor and subsequently enforce the rules.

Acknowledgements

Research for this paper was conducted under the Global Integrity Anti-Corruption Evidence (GI-ACE) Programme. This document is an output from a project funded by UKAid from the UK Government. The views expressed are not necessarily those of the UK government's official policies. We thank Yvonne Achieng, Ajibade Ayodeji, Yan Chen, Johann Graf Lambsdorff, Jose Guinot Saporta, Tanvir Khan, Tom Lane, Zach Mbasu, Benedict Oyo, Danny Parsons, Zhewei Song, and Franscis Torgbor for their help with the organisation of the online sessions. The authors thank for their comments participants in seminars at the University of Newcastle, the University of Heidelberg, FU Berlin and at the APSA Conference 2021, Gesellschaft für experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung annual meetings 2021 and 2022, GI Meeting 2022, HeiKaMaxY 2022, IMEBESS 2023, ESA 2023 World meeting, and the Regulation Research Conference in Regensburg 2023. The authors acknowledge support for the project from the Department for International Development of the United Kingdom. All remaining errors are our own.

	Offering		Taking		Reporting	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
China	0.721***	0.774***	0.549***	0.737***	-0.537***	-0.602***
	(0.088)	(0.106)	(0.094)	(0.110)	(0.151)	(0.175)
Bangladesh	0.556***	0.685***	0.663***	0.918***	-0.100	-0.228
	(0.160)	(0.170)	(0.182)	(0.192)	(0.294)	(0.311)
Africa	0.360***		0.637***		-0.475*	
	(0.100)		(0.104)		(0.276)	
Ghana		0.396***		0.692***		-0.571*
		(0.138)		(0.140)		(0.308)
Kenya		0.265*		0.693***		-0.270
		(0.154)		(0.157)		(0.322)
Nigeria		0.646***		1.101***		-0.725**
		(0.133)		(0.138)		(0.318)
Uganda		0.091		0.592***		-0.259
		(0.152)		(0.151)		(0.331)
UK		0.044		0.212**		-0.032
		(0.108)		(0.105)		(0.146)
Germany		-0.009		0.256**		-0.028
		(0.113)		(0.115)		(0.157)
Role: PS	-0.008	0.002	-0.108	-0.109	0.199	0.177
	(0.123)	(0.123)	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.229)	(0.235)
Role: OMS	-0.084	-0.075	-0.112	-0.117	0.272	0.251
	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.229)	(0.234)
Role: M	-0.284***	-0.287***	-0.347***	-0.348***	0.223*	0.231**
	(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.103)	(0.103)	(0.117)	(0.116)
M present	-0.829***	-0.846***	-0.363	-0.375*		
	(0.217)	(0.218)	(0.226)	(0.226)		
Protocol Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Participant characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,494	2,494	2,494	2,494	1,155	1,155
R-squared	0.072	0.080	0.076	0.085	0.063	0.070

Table 6: Acceptability of offering, taking, and reporting a bribe in the bribery game. Notes: Estimated marginal effects from linear regression models reported: robust standard errors in parentheses; *** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$; for the list, definitions, and sample means of the Protocol controls see appendix A; the Participant characteristics are labelled and summarized in tables 3 and 4; for summaries of Participant characteristics by role and treatment assignment see appendix A; estimated coefficients for Protocol controls and Participant characteristics available on request.

Dependent variable = 1 if a bribe offered by participant i in round j, 0 otherwise.						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
M present	-0.098***		0.001		0.001	
	(0.033)		(0.032)		(0.027)	
M in USA		-0.084**		0.007		0.006
		(0.033)		(0.033)		(0.028)
M in UK		-0.083**		0.007		0.006
		(0.036)		(0.034)		(0.029)
M in China		-0.116***		-0.017		-0.012
		(0.038)		(0.037)		(0.032)
M in Germany		-0.135***		-0.026		-0.023
		(0.038)		(0.034)		(0.030)
I believes M will report			-0.205***	-0.201***	-0.162***	-0.159***
			(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.029)
I believes PS will accept					0.622***	0.623***
					(0.056)	(0.057)
Acceptability of offering					0.034***	0.035***
					(0.010)	(0.010)
I in China	0.060	0.068	0.053	0.056	0.026	0.012
	(0.045)	(0.055)	(0.044)	(0.054)	(0.038)	(0.047)
I in UK		0.033		0.018		-0.007
		(0.052)		(0.051)		(0.044)
I in Germany		-0.013		-0.007		-0.025
		(0.052)		(0.052)		(0.042)
PS in China	-0.079***	-0.105***	-0.072***	-0.097***	-0.048***	-0.076***
	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.017)	(0.020)
PS in Bangladesh	-0.009	-0.034*	-0.011	-0.035*	-0.006	-0.033**
	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.011)	(0.016)
PS in Kenya		-0.050*		-0.053**		-0.051**
		(0.026)		(0.026)		(0.022)
PS in Nigeria		-0.027		-0.023		-0.037
		(0.028)		(0.028)		(0.025)
PS in Uganda		-0.051**		-0.046*		-0.041**
		(0.024)		(0.025)		(0.021)
Protocol Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Participant characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,703	2,703	2,703	2,703	2,703	2,703
R-squared	0.119	0.124	0.166	0.169	0.353	0.355

Table 7: The effect of the presence of a Monitor on bribe offering in the bribery game. Estimated marginal effects from linear probability models reported: standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered on participants in parentheses; *** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$.

Dependent variable = 1 if I believes M will report, 0 otherwise.		
	(1)	(2)
I in UK	-0.111	-0.112
	(0.072)	(0.072)
I in Germany	0.028	0.028
	(0.056)	(0.056)
I in China	-0.100	-0.100
	(0.090)	(0.090)
M in UK	-0.004	-0.003
	(0.036)	(0.036)
M in China	0.039	0.041
	(0.042)	(0.042)
M in Germany	0.089**	0.089**
	(0.041)	(0.041)
M in same Country as I		0.031
		(0.033)
PS country indicators	Yes	Yes
Protocol controls	Yes	Yes
Participant controls	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,822	1,822
R-squared	0.073	0.074

Table 8: Investors' beliefs about likelihood of Monitors reporting in the bribery game. Estimated marginal effects from linear probability models reported: standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered on participants in parentheses; *** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$; PS country indicators are always individually and jointly insignificant; ; for the list, definitions, and sample means of the Protocol controls see appendix; the Participant characteristics are labelled and summarized for the sample analysed in the appendix by country and by treatment; estimated coefficients for Protocol controls and Participant characteristics available on request.

Dependent variable = 1 if Monitor i reported conditional on Investor bribing in round j, =0 otherwise				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
M in UK		-0.148*		-0.149*
		(0.076)		(0.078)
M in China	-0.031	-0.082	-0.028	-0.081
	(0.060)	(0.063)	(0.061)	(0.066)
M in Germany		-0.073		-0.072
		(0.071)		(0.073)
I in same country	-0.068***	-0.053**	-0.071***	-0.056**
as M	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
I in UK		-0.024		-0.023
		(0.017)		(0.017)
I in Germany		-0.027		-0.024
		(0.018)		(0.018)
I in China		0.021		0.020
		(0.019)		(0.019)
PS in China		0.024		0.026
		(0.026)		(0.026)
PS in Bangladesh		-0.004		-0.000
		(0.025)		(0.025)
PS in Kenya		-0.119***		-0.112***
		(0.038)		(0.037)
PS in Nigeria		-0.043		-0.043
		(0.035)		(0.035)
PS in Uganda		-0.054		-0.060
		(0.043)		(0.042)
Believe I will			0.121***	0.119***
offer a bribe			(0.045)	(0.046)
Protocol controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Participant controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,333	4,333	4,317	4,317
R-squared	0.050	0.063	0.059	0.072

Table 9: Reporting by Monitors in the bribery game. Estimated marginal effects from linear probability models reported: standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered on participants in parentheses; *** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$; ; for the list, definitions, and sample means of the Protocol controls see appendix; the Participant characteristics are labelled and summarized for the sample analysed in the appendix; estimated coefficients for Protocol controls and Participant characteristics available on request.

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Appendix Tables

Table A1: Participant characteristics and treatment assignment by role in experiment

	Investor	Public Servant	Other member of society	Monitor	All
Number of participants	611	825	785	285	2506
Participant characteristics: Demographics					
Female	56%	53%	58%	53%	55%
Male	44%	47%	42%	47%	45%
Other gender	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Age (years)	22.89	23.09	22.77	23.00	22.93
Household income					
decile 1	1%	3%	2%	1%	2%
decile 2	3%	4%	3%	3%	3%
decile 3	10%	9%	10%	11%	10%
decile 4	13%	13%	14%	14%	13%
decile 5	17%	17%	14%	17%	16%
decile 6	19%	19%	19%	21%	19%

decile 7	20%	21%	23%	19%	21%
decile 8	12%	12%	12%	12%	12%
decile 9	3%	2%	3%	1%	2%
decile 10	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%
Participant characteristics: Major subject					
Sciences, Math, Engineering	23%	22%	22%	24%	23%
Business, Economics	31%	31%	33%	31%	32%
Health, Education	17%	18%	19%	14%	18%
Oth.Soc.Sci., H'ties, Lang's	13%	13%	13%	15%	13%
Other subjects	15%	16%	12%	15%	14%
Participant characteristics: Work experience					
in public sector	27%	29%	31%	31%	30%
in private sector	56%	57%	59%	58%	58%
in non-profit sector	38%	38%	37%	39%	38%
Experimental treatment assignment (random)					
No monitor	54%	62%	64%	0%	0.54
Monitor present	46%	38%	36%	100%	0.46

Country					
USA	13%	12%	12%	13%	12%
UK	10%	10%	11%	12%	11%
Germany	12%	11%	11%	11%	11%
China	14%	14%	15%	15%	14%
Bangladesh	9%	11%	10%	9%	10%
Ghana	11%	10%	10%	12%	10%
Uganda	10%	12%	11%	9%	11%
Nigeria	12%	12%	12%	10%	12%
Kenya	9%	9%	8%	8%	9%

Table A2: Participant characteristics by experimental treatment assignment

	No Monitor	**Monitor present**	**All**
Number of participants	1,344	1,162	2,506
Participant characteristics: Demographics			
Female	55%	55%	55%
Male	45%	44%	45%
Other gender	0%	1%	0%

Age (years)	22.90	22.96	22.93
Household income			
decile 1	2%	2%	2%
decile 2	4%	3%	3%
decile 3	9%	12%	10%
decile 4	14%	12%	13%
decile 5	16%	16%	16%
decile 6	19%	19%	19%
decile 7	22%	20%	21%
decile 8	11%	12%	12%
decile 9	2%	3%	2%
decile 10	1%	1%	1%
Participant characteristics: Major subject			
Sciences, Math, Engineering	22%	23%	23%
Business, Economics	33%	31%	32%
Health, Education	18%	18%	18%
Oth.Soc.Sci., H'ties, Lang's	13%	14%	13%

Other subjects	14%	15%	14%
Participant characteristics: Work experience			
in public sector	30%	29%	30%
in private sector	57%	59%	58%
in non-profit sector	37%	38%	38%
Experimental role assignment (random)			
Investor	25%	24%	24%
Public servant	38%	27%	33%
Other member of society	38%	24%	31%
Monitor	0%	25%	11%
Country			
USA	12%	13%	12%
UK	10%	11%	11%
Germany	10%	12%	11%
China	14%	15%	14%
Bangladesh	11%	9%	10%
Ghana	11%	10%	10%

Uganda	10%	11%	11%
Nigeria	13%	11%	12%
Kenya	9%	9%	9%

Table A3: Characteristics and treatment assignment of participants in Investor role and located in USA, UK, Germany or China

	USA	UK	Germany	China	All
Number of participants	79	64	71	87	301
Demographics					
Female	68%	56%	76%	76%	70%
Male	30%	42%	23%	24%	29%
Other gender	1%	2%	1%	0%	1%
Age (years)	23.94	21.41	22.35	20.08	21.91
Household income					
decile 1	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%
decile 2	3%	3%	3%	0%	2%
decile 3	9%	9%	7%	0%	6%
decile 4	8%	11%	10%	11%	10%

decile 5	16%	11%	11%	8%	12%
decile 6	20%	20%	15%	26%	21%
decile 7	20%	34%	15%	38%	27%
decile 8	18%	6%	28%	16%	17%
decile 9	5%	3%	8%	0%	4%
decile 10	1%	2%	0%	0%	1%
Major subject					
Sciences, Math, Engineering	38%	34%	4%	20%	24%
Business, Economics	15%	20%	21%	54%	29%
Health, Education	20%	11%	15%	1%	12%
Oth.Soc.Sci., Hu'ties, Lang's	14%	25%	28%	20%	21%
Other subjects	13%	9%	31%	6%	14%
Work experience					
in public sector	48%	23%	42%	11%	31%
in private sector	61%	47%	63%	32%	50%
in non-profit sector	38%	34%	45%	25%	35%
Experimental treatment assignment (random)					

No monitor	53%	52%	49%	52%	51%
Monitor present	47%	48%	51%	48%	49%

Table A4: Characteristics of participants in Investor role and located in USA, UK, Germany or China by treatment

	No Monitor	Monitor present	All
Number of participants	155	146	301
Demographics			
Female	69%	71%	70%
Male	31%	27%	29%
Other gender	0%	2%	1%
Age (years)	22.06	21.75	21.91
Household income			
decile 1	1%	0%	0%
decile 2	2%	2%	2%

decile 3	3%	10%	6%
decile 4	12%	8%	10%
decile 5	11%	12%	12%
decile 6	20%	22%	21%
decile 7	28%	26%	27%
decile 8	21%	14%	17%
decile 9	3%	5%	4%
decile 10	1%	1%	1%
Major subject			
Sciences, Math, Engineering	26%	21%	24%
Business, Economics	26%	32%	29%
Health, Education	13%	10%	12%
Oth.Soc.Sci., Hu'ties, Lang's	20%	23%	21%
Other subjects	15%	14%	14%
Work experience			
in public sector	32%	30%	31%

in private sector	54%	46%	50%
in non-profit sector	32%	38%	35%
Country			
USA	27%	25%	26%
UK	21%	21%	21%
Germany	23%	25%	24%
China	29%	29%	29%

Table A5: Characteristics of participants in Monitor role and located in USA, UK, Germany or China by country

	USA	**UK**	**Germany**	**China**	**All**
Number of participants	37	33	32	44	146
Demographics					
Female	70%	64%	59%	66%	65%
Male	30%	36%	41%	34%	35%
Other gender	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%

Age (years)		27.81	20.97	22.75	19.61	22.68
Household income						
	decile 1	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	decile 2	8%	0%	6%	2%	4%
	decile 3	14%	6%	16%	2%	9%
	decile 4	3%	9%	3%	9%	6%
	decile 5	16%	18%	6%	9%	12%
	decile 6	8%	30%	9%	35%	21%
	decile 7	27%	18%	41%	23%	27%
	decile 8	19%	15%	19%	16%	17%
	decile 9	5%	3%	0%	0%	2%
	decile 10	0%	0%	0%	2%	1%
Major subject						
Sciences, Math, Engineering		41%	39%	6%	25%	28%
Business, Economics		11%	3%	31%	55%	27%
Health, Education		16%	6%	13%	0%	8%
Oth.Soc.Sci., Hu'ties, Lang's		11%	42%	31%	11%	23%

Other subjects	22%	9%	19%	9%	14%
Work experience					
in public sector	46%	42%	50%	25%	40%
in private sector	68%	39%	94%	18%	52%
in non-profit sector	22%	39%	41%	36%	34%

Table A6: Protocol control variable names and definitions

Variable name	**Variable definition**
Sess	Within country session count, =1 for 1st session, =2 for 2nd, etc.
insday	Within session (within country) day count, =1 for 1st day, =2 for 2nd day, etc.
order2	=1 if country matches in bribery game series ordered according to list 2, =0 otherwise 1
order3	=1 if country matches in bribery game series ordered according to list3, =0 otherwise 1
order4	=1 if country matches in bribery game series ordered according to list4, =0 otherwise 1
owncl	=1 if playing partner in own country came last in series, =0 otherwise 1
TIlast1	TI index for last I (PS for Is) interacted with in bribery game series 1

maxr	Number of rounds completed by a participant[1]
Round	Round count =1 for 1st round, =2 for 2nd round, etc.[2]
Round2	Round count (round) squared 2
Vlong	=1 if participant took more than 8 hours to complete, =0 otherwise
Vshort	=1 if participant took less than 20 minutes to complete, =0 otherwise
bPSabr	=1 if Investor (in game) believes Public Servant (in game) will accept a bribe 3
bIobr	=1 if Monitor (in game) believes Investor (in game) will offer a bribe 4
AccOffer	Relative acceptability of offering a bribe[3]
AccReport	Relative acceptability of reporting a briber[4]

Notes: TIlast1 – derived from Transparency International's corruption index for 2020; 1 - used only in analyses of acceptability of different behaviours; 2 - used only in analyses of behaviours and beliefs; 3 - used only in the analysis of bribe offering by Investors; 4 - used only in the analysis of bribe reporting by Monitors.

Table A7: Experimental control variable means by sample

	Acceptabilities sample	**Is' offering and beliefs about Ms sample**	**Ms reporting sample**
sess	2.34	1.12	2.29
insday	2.10	1.45	2.32

order2	24%	-	-
order3	23%	-	-
order4	26%	-	-
owncl	26%	-	-
TIlast1	51.90	-	-
maxr	13.95	-	-
round	-	10.10	13.69
vlong	7%	3%	7%
vshort	14%	10%	9%
bPSabr	-	93%	-
bIobr	-	-	83%
AccOffer	-	-0.07	-
AccReport	-	-	0.68
Obs.	2506	2703	4345

Notes: TIlast1 derived from Transparency International's corruption index for 2020

Table A8: Which Investors respond to presence of monitors and presence of which monitors?
Dependent variable = 1 if a bribe offered by participant i in round j, =0 otherwise

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
M in USA	-0.084**	-0.084**		-0.062		0.042
	(0.033)	(0.034)		(0.067)		(0.067)
M in UK	-0.083**	-0.083**		-0.030		0.077
	(0.036)	(0.036)		(0.071)		(0.068)
M in China	-0.116***	-0.116***		-0.100		0.004
	(0.038)	(0.039)		(0.077)		(0.074)
M in Germany	-0.135***	-0.135***		-0.098		0.017
	(0.038)	(0.038)		(0.073)		(0.071)
M in same		0.000				
country as I		(0.019)				
M present			-0.072		0.037	
			(0.067)		(0.065)	
M present * UK			-0.095$^{\#\#}$		-0.122	
			(0.085)		(0.084)	
M present * China			0.060		0.044$^{\#}$	
			(0.080)		(0.079)	
M present * Germany			-0.120$^{\#\#\#}$		-0.120	

	(0.096)	(0.093)	
M in USA * UK		-0.054 ǂ	-0.097
		(0.083)	(0.083)
M in USA * China		0.098 ǂ	0.085
		(0.080)	(0.080)
M in USA * Germany		-0.148 ǂ	-0.147
		(0.101)	(0.098)
M in UK * UK		-0.140 ǂ	-0.160*
		(0.093)	(0.091)
M in UK * China		0.027 ǂ	0.001
		(0.089)	(0.086)
M in UK * Germany		-0.129 ǂ	-0.153
		(0.101)	(0.100)
M in China * UK		-0.092 ǂ	-0.099
		(0.098)	(0.096)
M in China * China		0.097 ǂ	0.075
		(0.092)	(0.088)

M in China * Germany			-0.094			-0.088
			(0.111)			(0.105)
M in Germany * UK			-0.095			-0.132
			(0.095)			(0.092)
M in Germany * China			0.020			0.018
			(0.095)			(0.091)
M in Germany * Germany			-0.109			-0.093
			(0.109)			(0.104)
Believe M will report					-0.204***	-0.202***
					(0.033)	(0.033)

continued overleaf

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
PSChina	-0.105***	-0.105***	-0.099***	-0.099***	-0.092***	-0.092***
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
PSBangladesh	-0.034*	-0.034*	-0.034*	-0.034*	-0.035*	-0.035*

	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
PSKenya	-0.050*	-0.050*	-0.044*	-0.044*	-0.048*	-0.048*
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
PSNigeria	-0.027	-0.027	-0.024	-0.024	-0.020	-0.020
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
PSUganda	-0.051**	-0.051**	-0.048*	-0.049**	-0.043*	-0.043*
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
I in China	0.068	0.068	0.034	0.034	0.031	0.031
	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.063)	(0.063)
I in UK	0.033	0.033	0.100	0.100	0.102*	0.102
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.062)
I in Germany	-0.013	-0.013	0.068	0.068	0.074	0.074
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)
Protocol controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Participant controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	2,703	2,703	2,703	2,703	2,703	2,703
R-squared	0.124	0.124	0.129	0.133	0.176	0.178

Notes: Estimated marginal effects from linear probability models reported: standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustered on participants in parentheses; *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1; ## sum of this

and coefficient on M present p<0.05, ### sum of this and coefficient on M present p<0.01, ł joint sig of M-country-I-country interactions p<0.1.

Appendix Country Distribution Bribery Game

This appendix details the countries or country combinations each participant was confronted with depending on their role, home country and treatment. Table A9 shows the number of decisions (countries or combinations of countries) that participants had to make according to their role and home country. Table A10 and A11 list the countries or countrycomibinations that each participant was confronted with.

We started with two basis lists that we used to create all combinations listed below. List 1 contained all 11 countries. List 2 contained 4 countries (US, UK, DE, CN) plus the homecountry. Investors and monitors came only from the countries in list 2.

To avoid extremely high numbers of decisions for investors and monitors in the monitor treatment we reduced the amount of countries for them by giving not all countries, but only one randomly chosen from a list of similar countries. These lists were “One G7 country” (US, UK or Germany), “One West African Country” (Ghana or Nigeria) and “One East African Country” (Uganda, Tanzania, Ethiopia or Keyna).

In addition, we sorted the list according to four different orders that were randomly given. Order 0 is depicted in the tables (e.g. A, B, C, D, E, F). Order 1 is the reversed order of the list (e.g. F, E, D, C, B, A). For Order 2, we split each list in half and reversed each half separately (e.g. C, B, A, F, E, D). For Order 3, we split each list in half and flipped both halves (e.g. D, E, F, A, B, C). For combinations of countries (in the monitor treatment), we first implemented the order and then we created the combination of countries.

	Number of Countries in the Baseline Treatment		Number of Country Combinations in the Monitor Treatment		
Home country	Investor	Public Servant+OMS	Investor	Public Servant+OMS	Monitor
UK, US, Germany	11	4	24	16	24
China	11	4	20	16	20

African countries	11	5	30	25	30
Bangladesh	11	5	25	25	25

Table A9: Number of countries (or country combinations) that participants had to decide on in the Bribery game, depending on role, treatment and home country.

Home country	Investor was making decisions about public servants and OMS in…	Public Servant and OMS were making decisions about investors in…
UK	UK; US; CN; DE; GH; UG; TZ; ET; BD; NG; KE	UK; US; CN; DE
USA	US; UK; CN; DE; GH; UG; TZ; ET; BD; NG; KE	US; UK; CN; DE
China	CN; UK; US; DE; GH; UG; TZ; ET; BD; NG; KE	CN; UK; US; DE
Germany	DE; UK; US; CN; GH; UG; TZ; ET; BD; NG; KE	DE; UK; US; CN
Ghana	GH; UK; US; CN; DE; UG; TZ; ET; BD; NG; KE	GH; UK; US; CN; DE
Uganda	UG; UK; US; CN; DE; GH; TZ; ET; BD; NG; KE	UG; UK; US; CN; DE
Tanzania	TZ; UK; US; CN; DE; GH; UG; ET; BD; NG; KE	TZ; UK; US; CN; DE
Ethiopia	ET; UK; US; CN; DE; GH; UG; TZ; BD; NG; KE	ET; UK; US; CN; DE
Bangladesh	BD; UK; US; CN; DE; GH; UG; TZ; ET; NG; KE	BD; UK; US; CN; DE
Nigeria	NG; UK; US; CN; DE; GH; UG; TZ; ET; BD; KE	NG; UK; US; CN; DE
Kenya	KE; UK; US; CN; DE; GH; UG; TZ; ET; BD; NG	KE; UK; US; CN; DE

Table A10: List of countries participants were confronted with the Bribery Game (Baseline treatment) according to their role and home country. Note: the country of the Public Servant is always the same as the one of the OMS. The order depicted in the table is Order 0. Standard alpha-2 country codes apply.

Home country	Investor was making decisions about public servants and OMS in COUNTRY1 and monitors in COUNTRY2. Monitor was making decisions about public servants and OMS in COUNTRY1 and investors in COUNTRY2.	Public Servant and OMS were making decisions about investors in COUNTRY1 and monitors in COUNTRY2.
UK	UK|UK; UK|US; UK|CN; UK|DE; OG7|UK; OG7|US; OG7|CN; OG7|DE; CN|UK; CN|US; CN|CN; CN|DE; BD|UK; BD|US; BD|CN; BD|DE; OWA|UK; OWA|US; OWA|CN; OWA|DE; OEA|UK; OEA|US; OEA|CN; OEA|DE;	UK|UK; UK|US; UK|CN; UK|DE; US|UK; US|US; US|CN; US|DE; CN|UK; CN|US; CN|CN; CN|DE; DE|UK; DE|US; DE|CN; DE|DE;
USA	US|US; US|UK; US|CN; US|DE; OG7|US; OG7|UK; OG7|CN; OG7|DE; CN|US; CN|UK; CN|CN; CN|DE; BD|US; BD|UK; BD|CN; BD|DE; OWA|US; OWA|UK; OWA|CN; OWA|DE; OEA|US; OEA|UK; OEA|CN; OEA|DE;	US|US; US|UK; US|CN; US|DE; UK|US; UK|UK; UK|CN; UK|DE; CN|US; CN|UK; CN|CN; CN|DE; DE|US; DE|UK; DE|CN; DE|DE;
China	CN|CN; CN|UK; CN|US; CN|DE; OG7|CN; OG7|UK; OG7|US; OG7|DE; BD|CN; BD|UK; BD|US; BD|DE; OWA|CN; OWA|UK; OWA|US; OWA|DE; OEA|CN; OEA|UK; OEA|US; OEA|DE;	CN|CN; CN|UK; CN|US; CN|DE; UK|CN; UK|UK; UK|US; UK|DE; US|CN; US|UK; US|US; US|DE; DE|CN; DE|UK; DE|US; DE|DE;
Germany	DE|DE; DE|UK; DE|US; DE|CN; OG7|DE; OG7|UK; OG7|US; OG7|CN; CN|DE; CN|UK; CN|US; CN|CN; BD|DE; BD|UK; BD|US; BD|CN; OWA|DE; OWA|UK;	DE|DE; DE|UK; DE|US; DE|CN; UK|DE; UK|UK; UK|US; UK|CN; US|DE; US|UK; US|US; US|CN;

	OWA|US; OWA|CN; OEA|DE; OEA|UK; OEA|US; OEA|CN;	CN|DE; CN|UK; CN|US; CN|CN;
Ghana	GH|GH; GH|UK; GH|US; GH|CN; GH|DE; OG7|GH; OG7|UK; OG7|US; OG7|CN; OG7|DE; CN|GH; CN|UK; CN|US; CN|CN; CN|DE; BD|GH; BD|UK; BD|US; BD|CN; BD|DE; OWA|GH; OWA|UK; OWA|US; OWA|CN; OWA|DE; OEA|GH; OEA|UK; OEA|US; OEA|CN; OEA|DE;	GH|GH; GH|UK; GH|US; GH|CN; GH|DE; UK|GH; UK|UK; UK|US; UK|CN; UK|DE; US|GH; US|UK; US|US; US|CN; US|DE; CN|GH; CN|UK; CN|US; CN|CN; CN|DE; DE|GH; DE|UK; DE|US; DE|CN; DE|DE;
Uganda	UG|UG; UG|UK; UG|US; UG|CN; UG|DE; OG7|UG; OG7|UK; OG7|US; OG7|CN; OG7|DE; CN|UG; CN|UK; CN|US; CN|CN; CN|DE; BD|UG; BD|UK; BD|US; BD|CN; BD|DE; OWA|UG; OWA|UK; OWA|US; OWA|CN; OWA|DE; OEA|UG; OEA|UK; OEA|US; OEA|CN; OEA|DE;	UG|UG; UG|UK; UG|US; UG|CN; UG|DE; UK|UG; UK|UK; UK|US; UK|CN; UK|DE; US|UG; US|UK; US|US; US|CN; US|DE; CN|UG; CN|UK; CN|US; CN|CN; CN|DE; DE|UG; DE|UK; DE|US; DE|CN; DE|DE;
Tanzania	TZ|TZ; TZ|UK; TZ|US; TZ|CN; TZ|DE; OG7|TZ; OG7|UK; OG7|US; OG7|CN; OG7|DE; CN|TZ; CN|UK; CN|US; CN|CN; CN|DE; BD|TZ; BD|UK; BD|US; BD|CN; BD|DE; OWA|TZ; OWA|UK; OWA|US; OWA|CN; OWA|DE; OEA|TZ; OEA|UK; OEA|US; OEA|CN; OEA|DE;	TZ|TZ; TZ|UK; TZ|US; TZ|CN; TZ|DE; UK|TZ; UK|UK; UK|US; UK|CN; UK|DE; US|TZ; US|UK; US|US; US|CN; US|DE; CN|TZ; CN|UK; CN|US; CN|CN; CN|DE; DE|TZ; DE|UK; DE|US; DE|CN; DE|DE;
Ethiopia	ET|ET; ET|UK; ET|US; ET|CN; ET|DE; OG7|ET; OG7|UK; OG7|US; OG7|CN; OG7|DE; CN|ET; CN|UK; CN|US; CN|CN; CN|DE; BD|ET; BD|UK; BD|US; BD|CN; BD|DE; OWA|ET; OWA|UK; OWA|US; OWA|CN; OWA|DE; OEA|ET; OEA|UK; OEA|US; OEA|CN; OEA|DE;	ET|ET; ET|UK; ET|US; ET|CN; ET|DE; UK|ET; UK|UK; UK|US; UK|CN; UK|DE; US|ET; US|UK; US|US; US|CN; US|DE; CN|ET; CN|UK; CN|US; CN|CN; CN|DE; DE|ET; DE|UK; DE|US; DE|CN;

		DE|DE;
Bangladesh	BD|BD; BD|UK; BD|US; BD|CN; BD|DE; OG7|BD; OG7|UK; OG7|US; OG7|CN; OG7|DE; CN|BD; CN|UK; CN|US; CN|CN; CN|DE; OWA|BD; OWA|UK; OWA|US; OWA|CN; OWA|DE; OEA|BD; OEA|UK; OEA|US; OEA|CN; OEA|DE;	BD|BD; BD|UK; BD|US; BD|CN; BD|DE; UK|BD; UK|UK; UK|US; UK|CN; UK|DE; US|BD; US|UK; US|US; US|CN; US|DE; CN|BD; CN|UK; CN|US; CN|CN; CN|DE; DE|BD; DE|UK; DE|US; DE|CN; DE|DE;
Nigeria	NG|NG; NG|UK; NG|US; NG|CN; NG|DE; OG7|NG; OG7|UK; OG7|US; OG7|CN; OG7|DE; CN|NG; CN|UK; CN|US; CN|CN; CN|DE; BD|NG; BD|UK; BD|US; BD|CN; BD|DE; OWA|NG; OWA|UK; OWA|US; OWA|CN; OWA|DE; OEA|NG; OEA|UK; OEA|US; OEA|CN; OEA|DE;	NG|NG; NG|UK; NG|US; NG|CN; NG|DE; UK|NG; UK|UK; UK|US; UK|CN; UK|DE; US|NG; US|UK; US|US; US|CN; US|DE; CN|NG; CN|UK; CN|US; CN|CN; CN|DE; DE|NG; DE|UK; DE|US; DE|CN; DE|DE;
Kenya	KE|KE; KE|UK; KE|US; KE|CN; KE|DE; OG7|KE; OG7|UK; OG7|US; OG7|CN; OG7|DE; CN|KE; CN|UK; CN|US; CN|CN; CN|DE; BD|KE; BD|UK; BD|US; BD|CN; BD|DE; OWA|KE; OWA|UK; OWA|US; OWA|CN; OWA|DE; OEA|KE; OEA|UK; OEA|US; OEA|CN; OEA|DE;	KE|KE; KE|UK; KE|US; KE|CN; KE|DE; UK|KE; UK|UK; UK|US; UK|CN; UK|DE; US|KE; US|UK; US|US; US|CN; US|DE; CN|KE; CN|UK; CN|US; CN|CN; CN|DE; DE|KE; DE|UK; DE|US; DE|CN; DE|DE;

Table A11: List of country combinations participants were confronted with the Bribery Game (Monitor treatment) according to their role and home country. Country combinations are denoted COUNTRY1\|COUNTRY2. Note: the country of the Public Servant is always the same as the one of the OMS. The order depicted in the table is Order 0. OG7 = "One Country G7", OWA="One West African Country", OEA = "One East Afrian Country". Otherwise, standard alpha-2 country codes apply.

Appendix Instructions

In the instructions, instead of the placeholder HOMECOUNTRY, the country of origin was shown. The placeholder values for MAXDECISIONS, OTHERCOUNTRY and OTHERCOUNTRY2 are detailed in the appendix about country distribution. Choice options are denoted with brackets.

Welcome

A study on economic decisions and beliefs
Lead Researcher: Professor Thorsten Chmura
You are being invited to take part in a research study about economic decisions and beliefs. The research is being conducted by a research team lead by Prof. Thorsten Chmura. Before you decide whether to participate, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. If there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information, please do not hesitate to contact us at thorsten.chmura@ntu.ac.uk. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part.
1. What is the purpose of the study?
-The purpose of the research is to study how individuals decide in a number of economically relevant tasks and what their beliefs are about how others decide in those tasks.
2. Why have I been chosen?
-You have been randomly chosen from the participant pool of PLACEHOLDER TEXT.
3. Do I have to take part?
-No. It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do, you will be asked to sign a consent form. If you decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason. If you withdraw, any information you have provided up until the point of withdrawal may still be used. Nobody at your university will be told whether you have/have not taken part in the research.
4. What will happen to me if I take part?
-You will be asked to participate in an online experiment and a survey, facilitated by members of the research team. The duration of the experiment will be 30-40 minutes.
5. What do I have to do to take part?
-Click on the Next button. You will be asked to read and agree to the consent form. Then you can proceed to the tasks.
6. What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part?

-Given the nature of the experiments and survey, it is not expected to cover sensitive or personal areas. All data will be treated anonymously. You are free to change your mind about being involved in the research at any time during the experiment and up to four weeks after the experiment has taken place.
7. What are the possible benefits of taking part?
-You will earn a participation fee and additional money, depending on your responses. In addition, your contribution to the research will greatly benefit our understanding of economic decision making and the role of beliefs in it. As a result of the research, practitioner and academic outputs will be available for the public.
9. Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential?
-Yes. No person will be informed of your individual choices, the decisions you make via the computer will be anonymised and no data will be stored at any stage that can be used to identify you.
10. What will happen to the results of the experiments/survey?
-The results will be used to produce practitioner and academic outputs.
12. Who has reviewed the study?
-The study has been reviewed by Nottingham Trent University and the University of Nottingham.
Thank you for reading this information sheet, and for considering taking part in this study. If you would like further information on the study, please contact:
Principle Investigator: Professor Dr. Dr. Thorsten Chmura, Professor in Experimental and Behavioural Economics, Nottingham Business School, Nottingham Trent University, Burton Street, Nottingham, NG1 4BU, Phone number: +44 (0) 115 84 4205 email address: thorsten.chmura@ntu.ac.uk

Consent form

- I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet and I have had the opportunity to consider the information.
- I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason, without my legal rights being affected. I understand that if I wish to withdraw, my data cannot be withdrawn because it is anonymous and therefore cannot be identified.
- If I take part, I give consent to participate in the study.
- If I take part, I give consent that my data can be used for analyses on the aggregate level. Personal data will be anonymized.
- I understand that data collected during the study may be looked at by members of the research team. I also understand that the records indicating any money I may receive at the end of the study will be transferred to the Nottingham Trent University, where they will be stored safely for auditing purposes. I give permission for these members of the research team to have access to my responses in the online survey/tasks and for the transfer of the payment records to Nottingham Trent University to take place.
- I agree to take part in the above study.

By clicking the button below you agree to participate in this study and you consent to all statements in the consent form above.

Introduction

Thank you for agreeing to participate in our study. You are going to make decisions in 5 tasks and then complete a short questionnaire. In some of the tasks you will be interacting with people in HOMECOUNTRY and in other countries. You will receive a participation fee. You can earn more money depending on your decisions. In the tasks you can earn points. The more points you earn, the higher your additional payment. Ten points correspond to EXCHANGE RATE. It is also possible that we will use your decisions to match them with future participants in our study. Hence, your decisions may also affect future participants' earnings.

You will not know until the end of the survey which task is to be used to determine your payment. So, you should engage in each task and task part AS IF it will determine your final payment.

Your decisions will be anonymous.

Please click the button below if you have finished reading the introduction and you are ready to proceed.

Instructions Task 1 (no monitor)

Your first task is to participate in a game involving 3 players: **an Investor, a Public Servant and an Other Member of the Society**. You will play this task as yourself with people in HOMECOUNTRY and then with people in a number of other countries. You will be randomly **assigned to be either an Investor or a Public Servant**. The **Public Servant** and the **Other Member of the Society** are always in the same country.

At the beginning the **Investor** and the **Public Servant** have 35 points. The **Other Member of the Society** has 25 points. The game proceeds as follows:

The **Investor** may choose whether to offer a side-payment, **up to 20 points**, to the **Public Servant** and how much to offer. The **Public Servant** decides the minimum amount they would accept as a side-payment.

- If the **Investor** does not offer a side-payment, **all players walk away with their initial points**.
- If the **Investor** offers a side-payment and that side payment is smaller than the minimum amount the **Public Servant** would accept, **the Investor ends up with 34 points, the Public Servant with 35 and the Other Member of the Society with 25 points**.

- If the **Investor** offers a side-payment and that side payment is greater than the minimum amount the **Public Servant** would accept:
    - **the Investor has 50 points minus the amount they offered as a side-payment**
    - **the Public Servant ends up with 30 points plus the amount they accepted as a side payment**
    - **the Other Member of the Society ends up with 10 points.**

The **Other Member of the Society** makes no decision, but their final earnings depend on whether the **Public Servant** accepts a side-payment from the Investor or not.

Once we determine for which country-related decision you will get paid, we will select a participant in that country. We will pay you and them according to the decisions you and they have made in the game.

Feel free to take notes of these instructions if you wish to do so.

Throughout the task, you will always be able to get back to these instructions by pressing the button labelled "Instructions".

Please click the button below if you have read the instructions and you are ready to proceed.

Instructions Task 1 (with monitor)

Your first task is to participate in a game involving 4 players: **an Investor, a Public Servant, a Monitor and an Other Member of the Society**. You will play this task as yourself with people in HOMECOUNTRY and then with people in a number of other countries. You will be randomly **assigned to be either an Investor, a Public Servant or a Monitor**. The **Public Servant** and the **Other Member of the Society** are always in the same country.

At the beginning the **Investor,** the **Public Servant** and the **Monitor** have 35 points. The **Other Member of the Society** has 25 points. The game proceeds as follows:

The **Investor** may choose whether to offer a side-payment, **up to 20 points**, to the **Public Servant** and how much to offer. The **Public Servant** decides the minimum amount they would accept as a side-payment.

- If the **Investor** does not offer a side-payment, **all players walk away with their initial points**.
- If the **Investor** offers a side-payment and that side-payment is smaller than the minimum amount the **Public Servant** would accept, **the Investor ends up with 34 points, the Public Servant with 35 and the Other Member of the Society with 25 points**.
- If the **Investor** offers a side-payment and that is greater than the minimum amount the **Public Servant** would accept:

    - **the Investor has 50 points minus the amount they offered as a side-payment**
    - **the Public Servant ends up with 30 points plus the amount they accepted as a side payment**
    - **the Other Member of the Society ends up with 10 points.**
- The **Monitor** has to decide whether they will **report the Investor** in case they **offer a side payment**. There is a 50:50 chance that the report will cause the **Investor** to be **fined** 20 points, **regardless** of whether the public servant accepts or not. The **Public Servant** is never fined.
    - If a report is **not filed** and the **Investor offers a side payment**, the **Monitor ends up with 35 points**.
    - If a report is **filed** and the **Investor offers a side payment**, the **Monitor ends up with 30 points**.
    - If the **Investor does not offer a side payment**, the **Monitor ends up with 35 points**.

The **Other Member of the Society** makes no decision, but their final earnings depend on whether the **Public Servant** accepts a side-payment from the **Investor** or not.

Once we determine for which country-related decision you will get paid, we will select a participant in that country. We will pay you and them according to the decisions you and they have made in the game.

Feel free to take notes of these instructions if you wish to do so.

Throughout the task, you will always be able to get back to these instructions by pressing the button labelled "Instructions".

Please click the button below if you have read the instructions and you are ready to proceed

Comprehension test (no monitor)

Suppose that an **Investor** offers a **side payment of 5 points**. The **Public Servant** will **accept a minimum amount of 3 points**. Is it TRUE or FALSE that in this case the investor earns 45 points, the public servant earns 35 points and the other member of the society earns 10 points? (True/False)

Suppose that an **Investor** offers a **side payment of 5 points**. The **Public Servant** will **accept a minimum amount of 10 points**. Is it TRUE or FALSE that in this case the investor earns 34 points, the public servant earns 35 points and the other member of the society earns 25 points? (True/False)

If the **Investor offers a side payment** and it is **accepted by the Public Servant**, this **reduces** the **points** received by the **Other member of society**. (True/False)

Click here to show the instructions for the game

Comprehension test (with monitor)

Suppose that an **Investor** offers a **side payment of 5 points**. The **Public Servant** will **accept a minimum amount of 3 points**. The **Monitor does not file a report**. Is it TRUE or FALSE that in this case the investor earns 45 points, the public servant earns 35 points and the other member of the society earns 10 points? (True/False)

Suppose that an **Investor** offers a **side payment of 5 points**. The **Public Servant** will **accept a minimum amount of 10 points**. The **Monitor does not file a report**. Is it TRUE or FALSE that in this case the investor earns 34 points, the public servant earns 35 points and the other member of the society earns 25 points? (True/False)

If the **Investor offers a side payment,** it is **accepted by the Public Servant**, and the **Monitor does not file a report**, this **reduces** the **points** received by the **Other member of society**. (True/False)

Click here to show the instructions for the game.

Task 1

Congratulations, you answered the questions correctly! Please click on the button to proceed.

Task 1 (investor, no monitor)

You are the **investor.**

The other member of society is always in the same country as the public servant.

This is screen 1 of MAXDECISIONS.

You are now matched with a public servant in OTHERCOUNTRY

How many points would you offer as a side payment to the public servant? (Options 1-20 or “I don’t want to offer a side payment”.)

What do you think is the minimum side payment that the public servant in OTHERCOUNTRY would accept? (Options 1-20 or “No side payment”.)

Task 1 (public servant, no monitor)

You are the **public servant**.

The other member of society is always in the same country as you.

This is screen 1 of MAXDECISIONS.

You are now matched with an investor in OTHERCOUNTRY.

What is the minimum side payment you would accept from investor in OTHERCOUNTRY? (Options 1-20 or “I would accept no side payment”.)

What do you think the investor in OTHERCOUNTRY would offer as side payment to you? (Options 1-20 or “No side payment”.)

Task 1 (other member of society, no monitor)

You are the **other member of society**.

The public servant is always in HOMECOUNTRY as well.

This is screen 1 of MAXDECISIONS.

The public servant is now matched with an investor in OTHERCOUNTRY.

What do you think the investor in OTHERCOUNTRY would offer as side payment to the public servant in HOMECOUNTRY? (Options 1-20 or “No side payment”.)

Task 1 (investor, with monitor)

You are the **investor**.

The other member of society is always in the same country as the public servant.

This is screen 1 of MAXDECISIONS.

You are now matched with a public servant in OTHERCOUNTRY and a monitor in OTHERCOUNTRY2.

How many points would you offer as a side payment to the public servant? (Options 1-20 or "I don't want to offer a side payment".)

What do you think is the minimum side payment that the public servant in OTHERCOUNTRY would accept? (Options 1-20 or "No side payment".)

Do you think the monitor in OTHERCOUNTRY2 will report you if you make a side payment? (Yes/No)

Task 1 (public servant, with monitor)

You are the **public servant**.

The other member of society is always in the same country as you.

This is screen 1 of MAXDECISIONS.

You are now matched with an investor in OTHERCOUNTRY and a monitor in OTHERCOUNTRY2.

What is the minimum side payment you would accept from investor in OTHERCOUNTRY? (Options 1-20 or "I would accept no side payment".)

What do you think the investor in OTHERCOUNTRY would offer as side payment to you? (Options 1-20 or "No side payment".)

Do you think the monitor in OTHERCOUNTRY2 will report the investor if he/she makes a side payment? (Yes/No)

Task 1 (other member of society, with monitor)

You are the **other member of society**.

The public servant is always in HOMECOUNTRY as well.

This is screen 1 of MAXDECISIONS.

The public servant is now matched with an investor in OTHERCOUNTRY and a monitor in OTHERCOUNTRY2.

What do you think the investor in OTHERCOUNTRY would offer as side payment to the public servant in HOMECOUNTRY? (Options 1-20 or "No side payment".)

Do you think the monitor in OTHERCOUNTRY2 will report the investor if he/she makes a side payment? (Yes/No)

Task 1 (monitor)

You are the **monitor.**

The other member of society is always in the same country as the public servant.

This is screen 1 of MAXDECISIONS.

An investor in OTHERCOUNTRY is now matched with a public servant in OTHERCOUNTRY2

Do you report the Investor in OTHERCOUNTRY if they offer a side payment? (Yes/No)

What do you think the investor in OTHERCOUNTRY would offer as side payment to the public servant in OTHERCOUNTRY2? (Options 1-20 or “No side payment”.)

Instructions Task 2 (no monitor)

Imagine an **Investor**, a **Public Servant** and **an Other Member of the Society** in **HOMECOUNTRY** are playing the game you have just played. Your second task is to answer 4 questions about the **Investor** and the **Public Servant**. Specifically, you have to evaluate some of the decisions that they could make on a scale from *very socially appropriate* to *very socially inappropriate*.

By socially appropriate, we mean behaviour that you think most participants in your country would agree is the "correct" thing to do. Another way to think about what we mean is that if someone were to select a socially inappropriate action, then another participant in your country might be angry at that person.

If this task is randomly chosen to determine your payment, then the computer will randomly draw one of the 4 questions to focus on in the calculation. **You will be paid 50 points if for the drawn question your evaluation is the same as the evaluation of the majority of 9 randomly chosen people in HOMECOUNTRY who have also answered this question. Otherwise you will earn 10 points.**

Please click the button below if you are ready to proceed

Instructions Task 2 (with monitor)

Imagine an **Investor**, a **Public Servant**, an **Other Member of the Society**, and a **Monitor** in **HOMECOUNTRY** are playing the game you have just played. Your second task is to answer 6 questions about the **Investor** and the **Public Servant**. Specifically, you have to evaluate some of the decisions that they could make on a scale from *very socially appropriate* to *very socially inappropriate*.

By socially appropriate, we mean behaviour that you think most participants in your country would agree is the "correct" thing to do. Another way to think about what we mean is that if someone were to select a socially inappropriate action, then another participant in your country might be angry at that person.

If this task is randomly chosen to determine your payment, then the computer will randomly draw one of the 6 questions to focus on in the calculation. **You will be paid 50 points if for the drawn question your evaluation is the same as the evaluation of the majority of 9 randomly chosen people in HOMECOUNTRY who have also answered this question. Otherwise you will earn 10 points.**

Please click the button below if you are ready to proceed

Task 2

Someone in HOMECOUNTRY is in the INVESTOR role and offers a side payment. This is…

Someone in HOMECOUNTRY is in the INVESTOR role and does NOT offer a side payment. This is…

Someone in HOMECOUNTRY is in the PUBLIC SERVANT role and accepts a side payment. This is…

Someone in HOMECOUNTRY is in the PUBLIC SERVANT role and does NOT accept a side payment. This is…

Someone in HOMECOUNTRY is in the role of MONITOR and decides NOT to report the investor.

Someone in HOMECOUNTRY is in the role of MONITOR and decides to report the investor.

Statements 5+6 only in the monitor treatment. All statements had to be rated on a 4-point Likert scale from 1 (very socially acceptable) to -1 (very socially inappropriate).

Instructions Task 3

In this game you will be asked to think of an integer number between 0 and 9. That is, you will be asked to think of one out of 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 or 9.

Once you have thought of a number, the computer will randomly choose an integer number between 0 and 9 and this number will be shown on the screen.

If the number you have in mind is the same as the number displayed on the screen, then you should click 'YES' and you will receive 6 points.

If the number you have in mind is NOT the same as the number displayed on the screen, then you should click 'NO' and you will receive 0 points.

You will play this game 10 times. In each repetition, you are free to think of a different integer number so long as it is between 0 and 9. If this task is selected to determine your payment, the points you get from this task will be the sum of your points across all 10 repetitions of the game.

Please click the button below if you are ready to proceed.

Task 3 - Screen 1 (repeated 10 times)

Think of a number.

Task 3 - Screen 2 (repeated 10 times)

The computer has randomly chosen this number: X
Is this the number you thought of? (Yes/No)

Instructions Task 4

This task involves a **Sender** and a **Receiver**. The Sender has 60 points and the Receiver has 0 points. The Sender can choose to send any amount of points between 0 and 60 to the Receiver. The Receiver has no decision to make.

You will undertake this task both as a Sender and as a Receiver. You will play with people from your own country as well as other countries.

If this task is randomly chosen to be paid, then the computer will make two draws. The first draw will determine whether one of your Sender decisions is to be used to determine your points from the task or if you are to be the Receiver in this task and someone else's Sender decision is to be used to determine your points. The second draw will determine **either** which of your Sender decisions **or** which other Sender's decision will be used to calculate your points from the task.

Please click the button below if you are ready to proceed.

Task 4

If you end up being a Sender, you are paired with a Receíver in OTHERCOUNTRY
How many points out of 60 will you send to a Receiver in OTHERCOUNTRY? (numeric input field)
If you end up being a Receiver, how many points out of 60 do you think a Sender in OTHERCOUNTRY will send to you? (numeric input field)

Instructions Task 5

In this task you will be given a short description of decisions that could be taken by someone in HOMECOUNTRY. You have to evaluate each of these decisions on a scale from very *socially appropriate* to *very socially inappropriate*.

By socially appropriate, we mean behaviour that you think most participants in your country would agree is the "correct" thing to do. Another way to think about what we mean is that if someone were to select a socially inappropriate action, then another participant in your country might be angry at that person.

If this task is randomly chosen to determine your payment, then the computer will randomly draw one of the $kwnumqs; questions to focus on in the calculation. **You will be paid 50 points if for the drawn question your evaluation is the same as the evaluation of the majority of 9 randomly chosen people who answered this question. Otherwise you will earn 10 points.**

Please click the button below if you are ready to proceed

Task 5

A contractor in HOMECOUNTRY offers a side payment to a public servant to increase their chances of being the one out of 6 short-listed to be offered a lucrative contract.

A contractor in HOMECOUNTRY does NOT offer a side payment to a public servant to increase their chances of being the one out of 6 short-listed to be offered a lucrative contract.

A public servant in HOMECOUNTRY is in charge of allocating a contract. There are 6 contractors on the short list. One of the contractors offers a substantial side payment. The public servant accepts the side payment and awards the contract to the contractor.

A public servant in HOMECOUNTRY is in charge of allocating a contract. There are 6 contractors on the short list. One of the contractors offers a substantial side payment. The public servant does NOT accept the side payment and does NOT award the contract to the contractor.

Someone in HOMECOUNTRY is in a monitoring role and decides NOT to file a report that may lead to a fine being imposed on a contractor who tries to offer a side payment a public servant to secure a contract.

Someone in HOMECOUNTRY is in a monitoring role and decides to file a report that may lead to a fine being imposed on a contractor who tries to offer a side payment a public servant to secure a contract.

Statements 5+6 only in the monitor treatment. All statements had to be rated on a 4-point Likert scale from 1 (very socially acceptable) to -1 (very socially inappropriate).

Questionnaire part 1/8 (demographics)

Please answer the following questions.

- What is your gender? (male/female/other)
- What is your age? (in years)
- What is your relationship status? (Married/Widowed/Divorced/Separated/Single/Civil Partnership/Co-habitating)
- How many children do you have? (0/1/2/3 or more)
- How many siblings do you have? (0/1/2/3/4/5/6 or more)
- Which of the following denominations describes you better? (No religion/Catholic Christian/Protestant Christian/Muslim/Orthodox Christian/Eastern Religion/Other denomination)
- How religious are you? (5-point Likert scale from not religious at all to very religious)
- What is your nationality? Please answer as it is stated on your passport/ID card. If you have more than one, state them all. (free text)
- Would you describe yourself as politically on the “left” (e.g. a liberal) or on the “right” (e.g. a conservative)? (Far left/left, centre/right/far right)
- What is your major, i.e., the main subject of your degree? (Medicine/dentistry & health/Agriculture/forestry & veterinary science/Biological/mathematical & physical sciences/Engineering & technology/Architecture & planning/Administrative & business studies/Economics/Social studies/Humanities & language based studies & archaeology/Design/creative & performing arts/Education/Other)

Questionnaire part 2/8 (Big 5)

Please answer the following questions. I see myself as someone who…

- Worries a lot
- Gets nervous easily
- remains calm in tense situations
- is talkative
- is outgoing, sociable
- is reserved
- is original, comes up with new ideas
- values artistic, aesthetic experiences
- has an active imagination
- is sometimes rude to others
- has a forgiving nature
- is considerate and kind to almost everyone
- does a thorough job
- tends to be lazy
- does things efficiently

(7-point Likert scale from Strongly disagree to strongly agree for each item)

Questionnaire part 3/8 (Employment)

Please answer the following questions.

- In what sector do you currently work? (Public sector/Private sector/Non-profit sector/Running my own business/I'm not working)
- Have you ever worked in the Public sector? (Yes/No)
- Have you ever worked in the Private Sector? (Yes/No)
- Have you ever worked in the Non-profit Sector? (Yes/No)
- In what sector do you see yourself working 5 years after you graduate? (Public sector/Private sector/Non-profit sector/Running my own business/I don't know)

Questionnaire part 4/8 (Networks/Income)

Please answer the following questions.

- Do you use social media? (Never/Rarely/A little/Sometimes/A lot)
- Approximately how many social media friends do you have? (Total across all platforms) (0/1-50/51-150/151-250/>250)
- Of your friends on social media, with how many do you interact on a given week online? (0/1-5/6-15/16-25/>25)

- Excluding social media, how many friends do you keep in regular contact with (communicate at least once a month)? (0-10/11-20/21-30/31-40/41-50/>50)
- In the last 6 months, how often have you or your family gone without enough food to eat? (Never/Rarely/Sometimes/Quite often/Very often)
- In the last 6 months, how often have you or your family gone without medical treatment or medicine that you needed? (Never/Rarely/Sometimes/Quite often/Very often)
- How would you best describe your household income (all wages, salaries, pensions, other income) when compared to the rest of your country where 1 is the poorest and 10 the wealthiest in your country)

Questionnaire part 5/8 (Risk)

Please answer the following questions. People can behave differently in different situations. How would you rate your willingness to take risks in the following areas?

Likert-Scale from 1 (Not at all willing to take risks) to 10 (Fully prepared to take risks)

- In financial matters?
- In your occupation?
- With your health?
- Becoming exposed to COVID-19 (coronavirus)?
- Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks?

Questionnaire part 6/8 (Trust)

Please answer the following questions. How much do you trust people… (Do not trust at all/A little trust/Somewhat trust/Quite a bit of trust/Complete trust)

- ...from your family?
- ...from your neighbourhood?
- ...you know personally?
- ...you meet for the first time?
- ...of another religion?
- ...of another nationality?

Questionnaire part 7/8 (Covid19)

Please answer the following questions.

- On a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 is Totally Unprepared and 10 is Totally Prepared, my government's national readiness for a pandemic such as COVID-19 (Coronavirus) was…

- On a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 is Totally Ineffective and 10 is Totally Effective, my government's response to COVID-19 (Coronavirus) has been…
- How much are you personally doing to prevent and/or slow the spread of COVID-19 (Coronavirus), compared to others?
- How many people do you know personally, that likely are or have been infected? (0/1/2-4/5-9/10 or more)

Questionnaire part 8/8 (Corruption)

Please answer the following questions

- Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? Disagree Strongly is 1 and Agree Strongly is 10.
    - Corruption is part of the business culture in my country.
    - Too close links between business and politics in my country lead to corruption.
    - In my country the only way to succeed is to have political connections.
    - In my country, favoritism and corruption hamper business competition.
    - My government's efforts to combat corruption are effective.
    - Claiming government benefits which you are not entitled to can never be justified.
    - Cheating on tax if you have the chance can never be justified.
    - Jumping a queue (i.e. bypassing a queue) in a public office by using personal contacts can never be justified.
    - Jumping a queue in a public office by giving a "gift" to the public officer can never be justified.
    - Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties can never be justified.

- Have you or has any of your relatives ever been asked to pay a bribe, make a "side payment" or give a "gift" by a public official? (Never/Rarely/Sometimes/Quite often/Very often)
- Have you or any of your relatives ever reported a public service provider who asked for a bribe/side payments/ gifts? (Never/Rarely/Sometimes/Quite often/Very often)

End of questionnaire

Thanks for your participation You are done with the questionnaire and with the experiment. Your payment will be calculated very soon. Your payment will be transferred to your PLACEHOLDER SERVICE within PLACEHOLDER LAB RULES FOR DURATION. You can close this window now.