# LEVERAGING THE ROLE OF THE URBAN PLANNING PROFESSION FOR ONE OF THE CENTRAL POLICY CHALLENGES OF OUR TIMES

by Dieter Zinnbauer

## ABOUT CITIES OF INTEGRITY

This project investigates the important integrity nexus in development – urbanisation and corruption – and works with a group of pivotal stakeholders – urban planners – that is uniquely positioned to help address related corruption risks.

## ABOUT THE CENTRE FOR URBAN RESEACH & PLANNING

The Centre for Urban Research and Planning (CURP) is an interdisciplinary research initiative focusing on the dynamics of Zambia's urbanisation and spatial planning. CURP was formed to fill the information and knowledge gap that has been created over the years in Zambia due to the lack of dedicated and coordinated research on urbanisation and planning topics. It places particular emphasis on defensible and policy-relevant research to inform a sustainable human settlements development discourse in Zambia and the region.

## ABOUT THE AFRICAN CENTRE FOR CITIES

The African Centre for Cities, based at the University of Cape Town, is a leading knowledge centre conducting meaningful reseach on how to understand, recast and address pressing urban crises, particularly on the African continent. Since most urban challenges—for example, food security, climate change adaptation, economic inclusion, cultural vitality and tolerance—are inherently interdisciplinary and spatially layered, ACC nurtures the co-production of knowledge favouring and cultivating critical Southern perspectives.Through its research ACC aims to develop imaginative policy discourses and practices to promote vibrant, just and sustainable cities. This purpose has become all the more pertinent with the adoption of Agenda 2063 at a pan-African level, which chimes with the 2030 global agenda for sustainable development.

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## RATIONALE AND OVERVIEW

Tackling corruption in urban development is a key policy challenge of our time. Activating the professional integrity of the urban planning community is a particularly promising and underexplored response to this challenge, especially in the context of Africa. These are the two key messages that this working paper seeks to advance, referencing some of the most pertinent empirics on urban corruption (section 1), as well as the latest thinking and learning in anti-corruption (section 2). As such, this paper seeks to speak to scholars, practitioners, and activists in both the anti-corruption and urban development fields – two largely disconnected communities that could greatly benefit from a crossdisciplinary conversation on building cities of integrity.

This paper also serves as the backdrop and rationale for "Cities of Integrity", a new research and action initiative hosted by the African Centre for Cities (ACC) at the University of Cape Town (UCT), and supported by the UK's Department for International Development GI-ACE Programme. The paper's final section (section 3) shows how the urban development and anti-corruption insights described in sections 1 and 2 have directly inspired the design of this initiative. In this section we also preview the three main workstreams to be carried out in 2019/20, which will be further elaborated and reported on in future working papers in this series.

## 1 INTEGRITY AND CORRUPTION IN URBAN DEVELOPMENT – A KEY POLICY CHALLENGE OF OUR TIMES

### 1.1 THE ELEPHANT IN THE CITY

At the closing ceremony of the Seventh World Urban Forum in 2014, the world's premier policy event on cities, Sergio Farrado, former mayor of Medellin, made an impassioned plea. He admonished the assembled global audience of city leaders, urban practitioners, business, and civil society to finally begin paying more attention to the "elephant in the room", a challenge that he described as "harder to fight than guerrillas".[1] The challenge he identified as crucial to the future of cities was corruption. Corruption is typically defined as the "abuse of entrusted power for private gain" (Transparency International 2009), and covers a vast set of practices from street-level bribery for services, to procurement fraud, political cronyism, and incidences of wholesale policy or even state capture, where rules and institutions are systematically bent to unfairly benefit a cabal of special interests.

### 1.2 A WORRYING BIG PICTURE

The overall empirical landscape of corruption, both in Africa and globally, indeed presents a troubling picture. Roughly one in five people, both globally and in the region, report having been asked for a bribe when accessing basic public services, a proportion that climbs to a staggering one in three service users in countries such as Kenya, Ghana, Nigeria, or Uganda (Transparency International 2015). Around the world, between 10% to 40% of public budgets are estimated to be regularly lost due to various forms of corruption, including embezzlement, procurement fraud, collusion, and mis-specified or substandard work that goes unsanctioned or even undetected when corruption comes into play.[2] Sadly, the empirical evidence also suggests that women, the poor, and other marginalized groups suffer most from these practices (Justesen and Bjornskov 2012; Zinnbauer 2013). Equally troubling, progress against corruption remains elusive. Around 60% of people across the world typically indicate that they feel corruption has worsened in the twelve months preceeding the survey (e.g., a startling 64% in South Africa, and 66% in Zambia), and that governments are not doing a good job in tackling it (Transparency International 2019).

This widespread public perception is confirmed by anti-corruption experts, whose assessments bemoan the limited impact of decades of related reform efforts and donor spending (see section 2).

### 1.3 CITIES AS HIGH-RISK ZONES

Cities and the dynamics of urbanization come with particularly high corruption risks for a number of intertwined reasons.

First, competition for scarce urban resources and services – from land and housing, to water, electricity, and environmental support systems – is particularly intense in rapidly growing urban agglomerations. In many urban areas in developing regions, the gulf between service supply and demand is widening. In Zambia for example, the share of the urban population

with access to piped water and improved sanitation has decreased between 1990 and 2015 (Satterthwaite 2016). This trend is expected to accelerate further with the unfolding of climate change, which puts additional stress on existing resources (IPPC 2014). Scarcity and shortages create leverage for extortion and rent-seeking on the part of suppliers and gatekeepers, while also motivating corrupt behaviour to "jump the queue" and secure preferential treatment on the demand side. As a consequence, across Africa, urban residents are 25% more likely to have paid bribes for essential services than their peers in rural settings (Transparency International 2015).

Second, local government capabilities are often outpaced by urban population growth (Lall et al. 2017) making enforcement of applicable rules and regulations more difficult, and impunity for corrupt acts more likely, thus encouraging further pursuit of such activities.

Third, rapid territorial expansion – typically cities' spatial growth is twice as fast as population growth (Angel et al. 2011) – means that city governance is increasingly fragmented and difficult to coordinate across a growing number of involved local districts and authorities (McCarney et al. 2011). In sub- Saharan Africa, the spatial area covered by urban settlements is predicted to increase twelve-fold between 2000 and 2050 (Dodman et al. 2017). Effective governance of territorial expansion is further hampered by hybrid and incoherent land tenure regimes (state and customary tenure regimes), rendering land administration and urban development management problematic and costly.

Fourth, high degrees of informality in urban settlements (on average 60% across Africa (Lall et al. 2017)) and urban economic life amplify precarious livelihoods and vulnerabilities to extortion with disproportionate victimization of such groups well documented (Chen et al. 2016).

Fifth, urban growth is projected to be particularly rapid in countries that already face high corruption risks. Eight of the ten countries forecast to experience the highest urbanization rates between 2014 and 2050 are perceived to be saddled with high levels of public sector corruption, and rank in the bottom half of countries globally when it comes to expert perceptions of the severity of public sector corruption.[3]

Finally, the continuous influx of new, ethnically diverse, and often poor residents to cities has historically been observed to be conducive to the so-called urban machines – or systems of political patronage in which politicians purchase political support and votes from these new arrivals through the targeted doling out of government jobs and spoils, rather than by building programmatic policy platforms to compete for votes (Scott 1969). The African variants of such corrupt urban patronage systems are often built more strongly around ethnic identities than in other regions (Resnick 2012), and thus also raise the risk of fuelling ethnic conflict (see also section 1.6).

Taken together, these factors result in an urban governance context that presents high risks for corruption and illicit enrichment of various types.

### 1.4 THE KEY ISSUE OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT

The planning and managing of urban development comes with particularly high and consequential corruption risks.

The financial value at stake and potential windfall profits tied to urban development decisions are massive. Real estate is the biggest, most important global store of wealth today. With an estimated aggregate value of more than USD 200 trillion, real estate is worth more than the combined value of all stocks, shares, and bonds, or more than eight times the global market value of all agricultural and forestry land (HSBC 2017). It accounts for up to 70% of all banking activity in advanced economies (Turner 2015), and is considered the main driver of rising inequality (Alvaredo et al. 2017; Stiglitz 2015; Rognlie 2016).

African cities are increasingly being subjected to similar dynamics. Real estate is already the largest category in foreign direct investments (Mauck and Price 2016). Five of what are considered the top ten most dynamic real estate markets in frontier economies are in Africa (Cushman&Wakefield 2015). The continent is viewed as having the highest real estate value growth potential from a global perspective (HSBC 2017), and urban land and real estate prices are on the rise. In an extreme example, some periurban areas of Kigali have experienced a more than 1000-fold increase in land value (Kopanyi and Murray 2016). Similarly, urban development is a hotspot for global infrastructure build-out, with an estimated 70% of all infrastructure spending between 2015 and 2030 projected to go into urban areas, thus surpassing in value the USD 50 trillion stock of all currently installed infrastructure around the world (Cities Climate Finance Leadership Alliance 2015).

While urban development's extremely high financial stakes are fundamentally shaped by related planning and policy decisions, the determination of which decisions and policies are truly in the public interest is often contested and open to interpretation. They are shaped by calculative technologies that are highly sensitive to parametric choice – and thus amenable

to strategic misrepresentation of costs and benefits (Flyvbjerg and Molloy 2011) – and often privileges financially quantifiable claims over interests that cannot be expressed in such terms (Robin 2018). Further, the quest to determine public interest(s) is meant to be guided by participatory and deliberative processes, which in turn are vulnerable to tokenism, manipulation, and inequality of voice, particularly in contexts with weak and constrained civic engagement capabilities (Connelly 2010; Fainstein 2000; Legacy 2017).

What's more, even after the fact, determining which people and special interests have benefitted most, and whether involved decisionmakers might have had direct conflicts of interests and enriched themselves, is extremely difficult. The reason for this involves a three-fold opacity that typically afflicts urban land markets:

- First, information on the actual beneficial owner of a property is often unclear, difficult to access, or not available at all. Customary ownership regimes inconsistently coexist with formal registration practices. Across sub-Saharan Africa, only 10% of total land is estimated to be formally registered (Lall et al. 2017). Not a single low-income country is making ownership information available for free to the public (World Bank 2018), and the ultimate beneficial owner is often hidden under layers of token owners and anonymous shell companies (Zinnbauer 2017).
- Second, property valuations and price developments are often largely opaque and publicly inaccessible in many dynamic urban growth markets. Official valuations are often outdated and incomplete. Comprehensive transaction data is privately owned by major market participants, and/or does not reflect real prices due to large grey- and black-market components. The majority of urban real estate markets in capital cities across sub-Saharan Africa are assessed as "opaque" or of "low transparency" (JLL 2018).
- Third, legal requirements for senior government officials and political officeholders to regularly disclose their incomes, assets, and interests remain very limited and poorly enforced at both national and local levels. Despite related laws on the books in many countries, not a single country in Africa has effective, publicly accessible disclosure systems in this area (Global Integrity 2018).

All these factors – difficulties in preventing, detecting, or in sanctioning corruption, as well as the inscrutable steering of windfall profits and business opportunities to special interests – make urban development a particularly appealing vehicle for illicit enrichment (Zinnbauer 2013; Chiodelli 2018).

## 1.5 EMPIRICS OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT CORRUPTION
While the empirical evidence that can be gleaned from criminal prosecutions, investigative reporting, and academic research represents only the tip of the iceberg, it nonetheless paints a clear picture of a corruption industry flourishing in urban development. Following are three stylised, yet very common patterns of how corruption is playing out in the urban development context.

### TYPE A: PAY-TO-PLAY
A developer bribes policymakers or senior city officials to win tenders to develop lucrative projects, acquire public land below market price, illicitly grab privately-owned land with impunity, or circumvent applicable rules and zoning laws for his/her projects.

Even in contexts where checks and balances are considered rather strong, developers have been found to bribe or secretly finance the campaigns of politicians to secure access to lucrative plots and projects (e.g., USA,4 Germany[5]). In Spain, such practices have engulfed a vast number of key officials across the entire political party establishment (Jiménez and Villoria 2012). Bribes can also flow as in-kind contributions rather than cash. For example, in China, data from 1 million mortgage contracts show that officials are granted a 1% discount by developers when purchasing a house, a rebate that rises to 4% (the equivalent of 2/3 of an annual salary) for senior officials and property regulators. In cases elsewhere, policymakers were stealthily granted access to luxury real estate or generous renovations of their houses. Collusive alignments of interests between developers and decisionmakers can go further still. In an Australian study, politically connected developers were found to be much more likely to be included in and benefit from rezoning, capturing an estimated AUS 400 million from six rezoned areas alone (Murray and Frijters 2015). In Mumbai, Indian politicians moonlight as developers (Doshi and Ranganathan 2017); and in China, 60% of the top 150 listed real estate firms are politically connected to local governments, while 60% of state-owned enterprises run their own real estate businesses (Wang and Zhang 2014).

### TYPE B: URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE (MIS)DEVELOPMENT FOR RENT-SEEKING
Public infrastructure plans and their execution are optimized to enrich specific contractors during the execution phase, raise property and usage values of specific beneficiaries through tailoring expansion to their needs, or keep specific neighbourhoods underserved in order to allow private service providers to step in and fill service gaps at inflated prices. This phenomenon has been most closely examined with regard to water infrastructures. Private water vendors and local officials running elaborate kickback schemes have been found colluding to limit public access to water, thus maximizing private profits to the tune of a 50% mark-up over costs in Jakarta (Kooy 2014; Lovei and Whittington 1991) and Mumbai (Graham et al. 2013), while in Nairobi this practice led to an estimated 80% mark-up of water prices for underserved communities (Collignon and Vezina 2000). In the Mexican city of Neza, officials intentionally allowed water services to become dilapidated, so they could collect bribes for repair work, and also deployed selective shutdowns of services as political weapons (Herrera 2014). Similarly, service extension to underserved neighbourhoods in Lagos was sabotaged by decision-makers to protect private rent opportunities (Gandy 2006).

### TYPE C: URBAN PUBLIC PROPERTY AS PATRONAGE RESOURCE
In an approach commonly referred to as patronage, sitting governments have traditionally used jobs in the public sector and lucrative government contracts as the main currency with which to corruptly reward their political allies and purchase continued support. In more recent times of austerity, as public budgets have become finite and financial management more stringent, scrutiny of hiring and headcounts in the public sector have intensified and caused this type of patronage to run into trouble.

Filling this gap, publicly-owned land and public housing are increasingly observed to serve as a new currency for patronage in times of severe urban housing shortages and urban land price hikes. Public land and property are allotted to secure political allegiance, or land is confiscated and reassigned for the same purpose (e.g., Kenya[6]). Access to subsidized and thus coveted social housing is dependent on being affiliated with the "right party", while prime properties owned by the state are reserved for senior ruling party officials at a fraction of the market rent (e.g., Rome, Paris[7]).

These are just three examples of common patterns of corruption in urban development. Many other forms and formats exist, but these three frequently observed types illustrate three important insights:
- Corrupt influence is not confined to the project bidding and execution stage, but can affect the entire policy process from the design of rules, regulations, plans, and projects, all the way to the execution of public works projects, the operation of infrastructures, and the enforcement stage for rules and regulations;
- Corrupt transactions in urban development are not narrowly confined to a direct quid-pro-quo of transactional bribe payments in exchange for favourable treatment. Instead, dependencies and collusive interest alignments are being forged in much more diverse, subtle, and structural ways to nurture a nexus between political and economic powers for joint illicit enrichment;
- Professional urban planners are often involved in the planning and decision-making processes that underpin all three of these situations.

## 1.6 CONSEQUENCES BEYOND COSTS
It is important to note that the costs associated with these types of corruption in urban development are not just pecuniary or confined to losses of public resources and assets. Corruption in urban development also afflicts the very workings and development prospects of cities for generations to come. When corruption renders infrastructure, housing, and urban development dysfunctional, illtailored to public needs, or even discriminatory to specific neighbourhoods, it literally hardwires unjust, corrupt relations into the very fundaments of the city system. For example, corruption in building-code enforcement directly compromises the structural integrity of the built environment: an estimated 83% of all deaths from building collapses in earthquakes in the last 30 years occurred in highly corrupt countries due to massive corruption-fuelled violations of building codes (Ambraseys and Bilham 2011; Bilham and Gaur 2013).

At least equally consequential is the institutional and social impact of this type of urban development corruption. A sense of widespread corruption and the impunity of local elites perceived to ruthlessly shape urban destinies according to their own

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4 Los Angeles Times. A $72-million apartment project. Top politicians. Unlikely donors: 30 October 2016
5 Spiegel online. Ex-Chef des NRW-Baubetriebs zu langer Haft verurteilt: 13 February 2017; Tagesspiegel. Opposition greift Bausenator Geisel an: 18 May 2016; Sueddeutsche Zeitung. Die Regensburger Geldquelle: 6 November 2018

6 Klopp 2000
7 New York Times. Scandal over luxury apartments embarrasses Chirac: 7 July 1995; New York Times. In Rome cheap public housing hid for years in plain sight: 29 April 2016

interests not only have the potential to fatally undermine public trust in local political institutions (Seligson 2002); but also corrode the social fabric, the prospects for cohesion, and general trust in the community (Uslaner 2005), paving the way for both populist political demagoguery and inflamed communal relations in highly diverse urban societies.

Against this backdrop it is highly disconcerting that in a sample of African cities (surveyed as part of a set of 27 cities in three regions), a staggering 77% of residents believe that because of corruption, politicians and bureaucrats benefit most from urban reforms, a portion that is "only" 39% in South American cities (UN Habitat 2010). Similarly, more than 60% of people polled in 34 African countries think it is very likely that rich people can get away with paying bribes to falsely register land that does not belong to them, a number that rises to almost 67% in South Africa, and 72% in Zambia (Afrobarometer 2018).

All these considerations point to an urgent need to address corruption risks in urban development as a prerequisite for realizing the potential and pivotal role of cities and urbanisation for an inclusive, fair, prosperous, and sustainable future.[8]

## 2 PROMISING AVENUES TOWARDS URBAN INTEGRITY – INSIGHTS FROM ANTICORRUPTION RESEARCH AND PRACTICE

What can anti-corruption research and practice teach us about tackling corruption in urban development? It is worthwhile noting that the research and policy community around these issues has undergone quite a bit of critical internal reflection during the last few years, spawning a growing number of contributions that invite a rethink of corruption and anti-corruption (Heywood 2018).

On the plus side, there is a recognition that some progress is discernible, for example with regard to putting stricter new anti-corruption laws and disclosure rules on the books in many countries, and stepping up a crackdown on international bribery. Yet these advances are tempered by a growing awareness that poor enforcement of rules and regulation continues to be an issue, and that new loopholes are found and exploited faster than lawmakers can respond. Similarly, overall global impact on significantly reducing corruption is still regarded as fleeting, while backsliding has become a serious concern for many countries, where the onset of new forms of authoritarianism has begun to corrode some basic pillars of rule of law and public accountability (Mungiu-Pippidi 2015).

### 2.1 FROM AVOIDING THE WRONG TO DOING THE RIGHT THING

This lack of substantive and sustainable impact has spurred the search for alternative and complementary strategies to tackle corruption. Inspired by empirical insights from a variety of disciplinary perspectives, a new premise has gained popularity that could be simplistically summarized as follows:

> A narrow, legalistic focus on direct anti-corruption measures and a largely punitive approach to step up monitoring, legal sanctions, compliance, and related reporting requirements are not sufficient and at times even counterproductive. Instead, what holds more promise is a more encompassing approach that embraces the broader ambition of strengthening integrity, rather than reducing corruption as its main guiding principle.

Research from a variety of – often barely connected – perspectives has contributed to this evolution of anti-corruption strategies from a philosophy of compliance to one of integrity. Here are some of these perspectives and insights:

- You cannot have good rules for everything: Legal and organisational scholarship has long emphasized the impossibility of either codifying everything into rules and regulations (Williamson 1985), or pre-empting all potential ethical challenges through clear-cut ethical guidance and compliance procedures (Huising and Silbey 2011). Moreover, as a socio-legal perspective and accounts of institutional corruption make clear, any configuration of laws and regulations also reflects in varying degrees historical and ongoing asymmetries in political influence and hegemonic definition of norms. This means that at any given point in time, extant rule frameworks might not fully align with evolving notions of justice, inclusion, and public interest (Dagan and Kreitner 2018), and thus fail to provide sufficient or even fully appropriate guidance.
- You cannot police everything: Insights from organisational studies point out that even conduct that is clearly governed by rules and regulations is impossible to fully monitor and enforce. Both at the individual and collective level, actors have been observed to deploy a wide variety of strategies of everyday resistance, evasion, and simulated compliance generating cosmetic audit cultures (Clarke 2005; Kipnis 2008; Power 1997), shallow box-ticking efforts (Reddy 2019), or a type of theatrical transparency (Strathern 2000; Tsoukas 1997; Christensen and Cheney 2014).

- Regulating too much can be bad: Ethnographic accounts of bureaucracies and corporations highlight that overly expansive and rigid rule frameworks and excessive transparency standards might not be desirable in the first place, as they stifle room for the expert-based discretion, informal rapport, and risk-taking creativity that is required to do a good job and promote innovation and success (Bernstein 2012). In larger organisations a specialised compliance function can became an administrative island decoupled from actual business practice (Huising and Silbey 2018), or degenerate into a compliance-avoidance support service (Kelly 2017).[9] What's more, from a macroperspective, it is plausible to assume that a thicket of compliance regulations may become counterproductive in a high-corruption environment, as these rules systems themselves become subject to rent seeking and offer opportunities for corrupt rule enforcers to create hold-up points and leverage for extortion. A general positive correlation between more rules (red tape) and more corruption is well established (Mauro 1995).
- A balanced mix of approaches should be re-established: Political scientists specialising in anticorruption and public administrations have also begun to advocate for reverting to a stronger focus on values and integrity rather than narrow compliance (Heywood and Rose 2015; Menzel 2015), for more attention to prevention as opposed to corrective sanctions (Rose-Ackerman and Palifka 2016; Doig 2012), and for a reintegration of ethics and accountability frameworks (Wedel 2012).
- A narrow compliance focus can backfire: Perhaps most troubling are contributions from socialpsychology and organisational studies that show how a focus on strict and narrow compliance can even be counterproductive. Such a strategy can induce individuals and organisations to push even more boldly into grey zones and questionable behaviour. Having ticked all boxes on legalistic compliance and duly disclosed conflicts of interests to clients (e.g., financial advisors who disclose the commissions they receive for recommending certain products), these actors now feel they have satisfied their moral obligations; thus equipped with a quasi-social licence to take their behaviour into illicit territory, they remain in compliance with the letter of the law, if not, of course, its spirit (Cain, Loewenstein and Moore 2010). Similarly, an excessive focus on pecuniary penalties or incentives can crowd-out prosocial motivations (Huising and Silbey 2018).
- Context matters tremendously: Accounts from social psychology, sociology, and ethnography also dispel the illusion of full ethical agency. Even perfectly well-intentioned people often end up engaging in or at least condoning egregious acts of corruption (Bandura 1999; Ashforth and Anand 2003). Peer influence, hierarchical pressure, adverse organisational culture, time constraints, various cognitive biases, and a host of other contextual and situational factors dilute and often override ethical reasoning (Sah 2017).[10]

If successfully activated, ethical motivations can trump self-interested calculus, and group norms strongly shape individual dispositions: Work on ethical conduct in social psychology and sociology confirms the power of ethical motives, and how it typically overrides monetary incentives and costbenefit analysis, provided these ethical drivers can be activated in a particular situation. What´s more, such ethical dispositions are not so much individualistic moral convictions, but rather are significantly shaped by social identity, extant group norms (Tyler 2005; Ellemers et al. 2019), and a sense of what kind of behaviour is appropriate in a specific situation (March and Olsen 2011).

### 2.2 AN INCOMPLETE INTEGRITY AGENDA

These insights reviewed thus far suggest a shift in strategic focus from compliance to integrity, with most of the current efforts to promote integrity taking aim at four possible levels:

- Individual: to build *personal integrity* through ethics training, invocation of social value systems, and related awareness-raising or priming techniques (Mazar, Amir and Ariely 2008; De Cremer, Tenbrunsel and van Dijke 2010).
- Organisational: to nurture *cultures of integrity* within specific organisations, emphasizing tone from the top, codes of conducts, and an enabling intra-organisational ethics infrastructure (Kaptein 2008; Warren et al. 2014).
- Sectoral: to build mutual trust and instil reciprocal commitment to integrity within a specific industry sector, and thus address the collective action dilemma that characterises many corruption situations and incentivises participants to deviate into corrupt behaviour as long as they expect their competitors to do the same (Persson, Rothstein and Teorell 2013). Such sectoral integrity initiatives include for example the extractives,[11] construction,[12] pharmaceutical,[13] and shipping sectors[14] (David-Barrett 2019).

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• Systemic and integrated: to put in place holistic governance systems, either as national integrity systems or local integrity systems, that contain a web of mutually-reinforcing transparency and accountability mechanisms to foster the integrity of all governance outcomes, although this approach is more geared towards structural than personal integrity (Six and Lawton 2013).

A fifth potentially potent source and site of integrity that has so far received relatively little attention from the anti-corruption perspective is the profession and professional community that a particular individual is part of, and the way the self-image, purpose, values, and ethical responsibilities that this community seeks to project and enact affect individual behaviour.

So far, anti-corruption and broader integrity efforts have only engaged with a small band of professional communities, such as the civil service (e.g., Meyer-Sahling, Mikkelsen and Schuster 2018), medicine (Vian, Savedoff and Mathisen 2010), and occasionally also the accounting and legal professions (Gunz and Gunz 2008). However, most of these accounts default to the narrower compliance view of anticorruption within the relevant profession, failing to place a systematic focus either on the broader lens of the profession's values or norms of integrity, or how to strengthen them. This is unfortunate, since a focus on professional communities offers a very promising path towards strengthening integrity for several reasons.

For a start, the fundamental social compact that defines the relation between society and professional communities places integrity at the centre of this relationship. Society entrusts professions with an important fiduciary role to exercise their skills and expertise in the best interest of both their clients and society. In return, professions are granted a degree of autonomy and self-regulation that would ideally allow them to put into practice and further develop and promulgate the canon of related responsibilities, free from interference by political or corporate interests (Durkheim 2013 (1957)); Abbott 1988; Goode 1957; Frankel 1989). Public integrity, fiduciary duty, and a degree of autonomy are thus not only some of the foundational principles of professions, but also accord these groups a central role in the broader social order as a complementary and indispensable mediating force between markets, bureaucracies, and communities (Freidson 2001; Streeck and Schmitter 1985).

The way professional communities are typically organised offers, at least in theory, an environment conducive to nurturing norms of public integrity, and translating those norms into practice. Professions are uniquely positioned for facilitating norm formation and internalisation, especially through their extensive compulsory education, as well as training programmes that engage professionals throughout their careers. Professional communities can also greatly aid norm diffusion and the forging of collective identities. With their specialised repertoires of knowledge and shared professional status, professional peer groups may be able to act as much stronger normative points of reference and sources of associational identity than mere organisational affiliations, which are generally more transitory.

Moreover, professions with a particularly exposed role in shaping public life, such as urban planning, typically actively cultivate and continuously advance a collective canon of ethical duties and professional responsibilities. Finally, for the most part, these professions also have representational bodies with selfregulatory powers at various scales that – if supported properly – can wield powerful tools for enforcing collective ethical codes and discouraging irresponsible behaviour (Haynes and Gazley 2011).

This stylized set of professional characteristics should not distract from the fact that the practical organisation and institutional form varies significantly across professions and country contexts. Also, there is always a real possibility that the institutional architecture of professions can either be underresourced and weak and / or co-opted in sinister ways to protect a small band of special interests from market competition and effective outside regulation (Willmott 1986). The latter in particular cautions against uncritically buying into a promotional self-image of the benign expert, and highlights the imperative to carefully examine how these professional infrastructures work in practice in very specific contexts. Such legitimate concerns notwithstanding, the general potential is undeniable: the institutional mechanisms and structures that professional communities are built upon can plausibly be harnessed to help construct efficacious self-regulatory institutional infrastructures and a distinctive professional identity with strong commitment to fiduciary duties to society and public integrity.

## 3 FROM (ANTI)CORRUPTION INSIGHTS TO AN URBAN INTEGRITY RESEARCH AND ACTION AGENDA, *THE CITIES OF INTEGRITY: URBAN PLANNING AND CORRUPTION IN AFRICA* PROJECT

In sum, all these insights point to a reworked paradigm for anti-corruption that has at least four strategic implications:

• A shift in focus from avoiding the wrong thing, to a complementary and likely even more important doing the right thing basis: from punitive, avoidance-focussed compliance to promotive, value-focussed integrity (Weaver and Treviño 1999);

• Moving the goalpost for institutional improvements from ideal best practice towards good fit and good-enough pragmatism (World Bank 2017). This move broadens the horizon from an emphasis on formal rules on the books and formally prescribed, ideal-type governance structures to engage with the actual lived experience of corruption and integrity – the everyday formal-informal blend and practical manifestations of related accountability relations (Tenbrunsel, Smith-Crowe and Umphress 2003), and the actual values, norms, expectations, perceptions, and contextual forces at play that underpin these practices and shape the prospects for reform;

• Introducing a broader perspective that views integrity as a systemic accomplishment, the realisation of which requires understanding and, where necessary, improving the system of stakeholders, institutions, and contextual drivers that shape individual and organisational conduct beyond narrow cost-benefit analysis of sanctions and gains from corruption (Six and Lawton 2013);

• Highlighting the integrity of professions as a promising and underexplored driver of integrity, and inviting a fresh focus in research and policy action to test this potential.

All of these strategic implications directly inform the three workstreams of our exploratory research project "Cities of Integrity" on how to best prepare and activate urban planners tackling corruption in sub-Saharan African urban development:

*Workstream 1* responds to the quest for a systemic approach that balances punitive measures with integrity promotion. This workstream will undertake a comprehensive assessment of the existing institutional integrity infrastructure of the urban planning profession in two countries in Africa, with the help of desk research and expert interviews. This includes an examination of the salience of corruption / integrity issues in urban planning education and training, the existence and substance of self-regulatory mechanisms (codes of conduct, complaints mechanisms, disciplinary procedures, and other enforcement measures), as well as mechanisms to discuss and further evolve professional value systems and their enforcement.

*Workstream 2* picks up on the pragmatic / practical turn. It moves from formal laws and institutions to an in-depth exploration of the lived experience of corruption and integrity by urban planners, primarily through practitioners' surveys in South Africa and Zambia. It seeks to elucidate the concrete experience and perception of corruption issues in the day-to-day work contexts of planning professionals. Moreover, it aims to gauge the actual values and normative dispositions of planners, vis-à-vis their work, peers, and professional community, as well as their experience / perception of the professional integrity infrastructures and the efficacy of those structures in daily practice.

*Workstream 3* proposes an exploratory action experiment that speaks directly to and helps test the promise of fostering integrity by activating professional resources, values, and identities. It revolves around the design, implementation, and multipronged qualitative assessment of a training programme on integrity for urban planning professionals in Zambia. More specifically, it will provide planners with a deeper understanding of corruption challenges in urban development, nurture a realistic sense of ethical agency and vulnerability to corruption, and identify practical tactics and resources for acting with integrity. Course efficacy will be assessed through a baseline and end line survey of participants, as well as two rounds of qualitative follow-up interviews 3-8 months after the course, to gauge content recall, changes in attitudes, and experienced practical relevance.

As an interdisciplinary research team, our goal is to explore the potential of promoting professional integrity within the urban planning community and strengthen integrity in urban development practice more broadly. We also hope to generate valuable insights and inspiration to other professional communities that seek to activate their vocational infrastructures for tackling corruption, thereby enhancing their respective governance systems. The proposed emphasis on professional identity and practice offers a promising new path for the refreshed paradigm to tackle corruption through a focus on integrity. This lens does not claim to override other incentives or identities, but provides an important additional layer of motivations, values, norms, and cognitive templates that can be brought into play when professional identities are particularly salient (Stets and Burke 2000); that is, in the day-to-day exercise of peoples' professional function as lawyers, doctors, architects, engineers, accountants, urban planners, or computer programmers, to name just a few of the old, new, and proto-professions that increasingly populate our expert and knowledge-driven economies.

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